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[W]hen men [and women] have realized that time has upset 
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe . . .  that the 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. .. . 
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 1 
509 
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
While it is 'true that an important objective of the First 
Amendment is to foster the free flow of information, 
identification of speech that falls within its protection is not 
aided by the metaphorical reference to a "marketplace of 
ideas." There is no reason for believing that the 
marketplace of ideas is free from market imperfections any 
more than there is to believe that the invisible hand will 
always lead to oftimum economic decisions in the 
commercial market. 
-(Then) Justice William Rehnquist 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent article, Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in 
America, my co-authors and I examined the ways in which the food 
industry has exercised powerful influence, often in unseen ways, 
over consumer behavior in the fast food market, even as the industry 
has evaded responsibility for the ensuing obesity epidemic by 
promoting to regulators, as well as to consumers themselves, the 
view that consumer behavior in the food market reflects the 
preference driven choices of individual consumers, which the 
industry claims merely to satisfy.3 
1 .  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (19 1 9) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
2. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Common of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 592 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
3 .  Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, Broken Scales: 
Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645 (2004) [hereinafter 
Broken Scales]. Of course, Broken Scales is just one piece in an extensive, and 
growing, body of scholarship dedicated to understanding the relationship 
between food industry practice and the obesity epidemic. See, e.g. , KELLY D. 
BROWNELL & KATHERINE BATTLE HOGEN, FOOD FIGHT: THE INSIDE STORY 
OF THE FOOD INDUSTRY, AMERICA'S OBESITY CRISIS, AND WHAT WE CAN Do 
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Broken Scales sought to apply, in the context of the obesity 
epidemic, an innovative approach to legal theory that my co-authors 
and I call "critical realism.,,4 Broken Scales was chiefly concerned 
with applying this innovative conceptual framework to a broad 
analysis of the fundamental legal-theoretic and social policy issues 
surrounding the obesity crisis.5 The present Article is more precisely 
dedicated to analyzing, from a critical realist perspective, the wisdom 
and constitutional viability of one possible policy response to the 
obesity crisis: a ban on junk-food6 advertising to children.7 
This Article seeks not only to show that an effective junk-food 
advertising ban could pass constitutional scrutiny, but also to 
demonstrate, through the rigor of a constitutional analysis, the 
wisdom of such an approach to this substantial social problem. 
Simultaneously, my purpose is to show, in the context of a difficult 
First Amendmen� question, that the critical realist approach to legal 
theory is capable of yielding substantial analytic insights, 
jurisprudential innovations, and public policy contributions.8 
II. THE CASE FOR BANNING JUNK-FoOD ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN 
A. It's Hard to Put it Better than Justice Thomas 
The case for banning junk-food advertising to children was 
made succinctly and persuasively by Justice Thomas in a recent case 
involving Massachusetts's ultimately unsuccessful effort to ban, inter 
alia, tobacco billboard advertising directed at children9: 
ABOUT IT (2004) (elaborating Brownell and Battle's conception of ''the toxic 
environment" and its relationship to overweight and obesity). 
4. For a brief synopsis of critical realism, see Part II.B.l. 
5. Broken Scales, supra note 3. 
6. For the purposes of this Article, the term "junk food" refers to highly 
caloric food that is relatively high in sugar and/or fat content and relatively low 
in nutritional value. There may be debate at the periphery about what food 
products qualify for this categorization, but that debate is not crucial to the 
analytic issues under review. 
7. Below, I will argue that an effective ban on junk-food advertising to 
children must be conceived of programmatically, and for the purposes of 
constitutional analysis, as involving a substantial limitation on such advertising 
to adults as well as children, and thus as a near total ban on junk-food 
advertising altogether. See infra text accompanying notes 1 50-1 52. 
8. See infra note 2 1  (summarizing other work in critical realism). 
9. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (200 1 ). 
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The second largest contributor to mortality rates in the 
United States [after "tobacco use"] is obesity.[IO] It is 
associated . with increased incidence of diabetes, 
hypertensiorl, and coronary artery disease, and it represents 
a public health problem that is rapidly growing worse. [II] 
Although the growth of obesity over the last few decades 
has had many causes, a significant factor has been the 
increased availability of large quantities of high-calorie, 
high-fat foods. [ 12] Such foods, of course, have been 
aggressively marketed and promoted by fast food 
companies. [ 13] 
Respondents say that tobacco companies are covertly 
targeting children in their advertising. Fast food companies 
do so openly . .  Moreover, there is considerable evidence 
that they have been successful in changing children's eating 
behavior.[ 14] The effect of advertising on children's eating 
habits is significant for two reasons. First, childhood 
obesity is a serious health problem in its own right.[IS] 
Second, eating preferences formed in childhood tend to 
persist in adulthoody6] So even though fast food is not 
addictive in the same way tobacco is, children's exposure to 
fast food advertising can have deleterious consequences that 
are difficult to reverse. 17 
511 
1 0. Id. at 587 (citing Jeffrey P. Koplan & William H. Dietz, Caloric 
Imbalance and Public Health Policy, 282 JAMA 1 579 (1 999» . 
1 1 . Id. (citing Ali H. Mokdad et al., The Spread of the Obesity Epidemic in 
the United States, 1991-1998, 282 JAMA 1519  (1999» . 
12. Id. (citing James O. Hill & John C. Peters, Environmental Contributions 
to the Obesity Epidemic, 280 SCIENCE 1371  (1 998» . 
13 .  Id. (citing Marion Nestle & Michael F. Jacobson, Halting the Obesity 
Epidemic: A Public Health Policy Approach, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human 
Services, 1 1 5 PUB. HEALTH REp. 12, 18 (2000» . 
14. Id. at 588 (citing Dina L. G. Borzekowski & Thomas N. Robinson, The 
30-Second Effect: An Experiment Revealing the Impact of Television 
Commercials on Food Preferences of Preschoolers, 101  J. AM. DIETETIC 
ASs'N 42 (200 1); Howard L. Taras et al., Television 's Influence on Children 's 
Diet and Physical Activity, 10 J. DEV. & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 176 ( 1 989» . 
IS. Id. at 588 (citing Richard P. Troiano & Katherine M. Flegal, 
Overweight Children and Adolescents, 101  PEDIATRICS 497 ( 1998» . 
16. Id. (citing Leann L. Birch & Jennifer O. Fisher, Development of Eating 
Behaviors Among Children and Adolescents, 101 PEDIATRICS 539 (1 998» . 
17. Id. at 587-88 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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Thomas meant his exegesis here facetiously. It was a step in his 
argument, concurring with the Court's holding in Lorillard Tobacco 
Co. v. Reilly, that the First Amendment forbids Massachusetts's 
tobacco advertising restrictions. 18 His purpose in the passage above, 
apparently, was to point to the absurdity of banning junk-food 
advertising as support for his view that the tobacco-advertising ban at 
issue in Lorillard was unconstitutional.19 In Part III, below, I will 
engage the constitutional issues posed by a ban on junk-food 
advertising to children?O For present purposes, however, irony 
aside, Thomas's summary provides an excellent starting point for 
appreciating the enormity of the childhood obesity problem, and the 
role that junk-food advertising plays in it. 
B. Fleshing Out the Case 
1 .  Critical Realism and the Situational Character 
Before further examining the relationship between childhood 
obesity and junk-food advertising, and the wisdom of an advertising 
ban, it is crucial to first establish the critical realist perspective.2 1 
1 8. Id. at 589-90 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
19. The quotation above is preceded by Thomas's warning that "it seems 
appropriate to point out that to uphold the Massachusetts tobacco regulations 
would be to accept a line of reasoning that would permit restrictions on 
advertising for a host of other products." Id. at 587. 
20. See infra Part III. 
21 .  Professor Hanson and I explicated the basic elements of critical realism 
in Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the 
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 
102 U. PA. L. REv. 129 (2003) [hereinafter, Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation]. 
In a companion article, · Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational 
Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L. J. 
1 (2004) [hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character], we 
provided a full-length assessment of the social science on which the model of 
human agency adopted in critical realism is based. In Broken Scales, we 
joined with Adam Benforado to apply critical realism to an analysis of the 
obesity problem. Broken Scales, supra note 3 .  For other applications and 
elaborations of critical realism, see also Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The 
Costs of Dispositionism: The Premature Demise of Situationist Law and 
Economics, 64 MD. L. REv. 24 (2005); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, 
Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and 
Legal Theory, 77 S.  CAL. L. REv. 1 103 (2004); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, 
The D/usion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and 
Corporate Lciw, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1 (2004). 
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Critical realism begins legal analysis with a conception of 
human agency that differs dramatically from that adopted in much 
conventional legal theory, but one that is very familiar to other social 
sciences that are· dedicated to studying how humans actually think 
and behave. Deeply steeped in social psychology, and allied social 
sciences, critical realism strives to establish a perspective on human 
agency that transcends our intuitive conception of the sources of our 
own conduct, especially in those areas of experience where our 
intuitions about ourselves may be wrong, or misguided. To that end, 
critical realism embraces a counterintuitive sensitivity to profoundly 
influential, though largely hidden, cognitive, biological, and 
psychological processes that encourage us humans to view our own 
behavior, and other peoples' behavior, as being driven largely by the 
dictates of individual disposition, and to miss the pervasive 
situational influences on behavior.22 Critical realism refers to this 
distorted self-conception, which all humans share to varying degrees, 
as dispositionism, because it magnifies the role of disposition and 
misses the powerful role of unseen situational influence on human 
behavior?3 
The figure of the "rational actor" that has become so widespread 
in legal analysis through the influence of the law and economics 
movement is a formalized elaboration of the basic dispositionist 
misconception?4 The rational actor, in essence, is an actor who 
22. "Disposition" refers to our intuitive experience of our own thoughts, in 
particular our own individually ordered opinions and preferences which we 
carry within us to different behavioral contexts, and our intuitive experience of 
our own will manifesting our dispositions in our behavior. See generally 
Hanson & Yosifon The Situational Character, supra note 21, at 6-31 
(elaborating this conception of disposition and dispositionism). "Situational 
influences," as Hanson and I use the phrase, represent those features of the 
external world-the framing of information, for example, which influence our 
thoughts and behaviors in ways we do not appreciate, instead mistakenly 
attributing the sources of our thoughts and behaviors to our own dispositions. 
Somewhat more subtly, we also refer to "internal" situational influences, 
which are those features of our inner lives-our cognitive biases, knowledge 
structures, motivations, visceral factors, etC.-which influence profoundly our 
thinking and behavior, but which are opaque to our conscious awareness of 
ourselves. See generally id. at 32-36 (elaborating this notion of internal and 
external situation). 
23. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 21, at 250-59 
(discussing cross-cultural differences in degrees of dispositionism). 
24. See id. at 1 44-52 (scrutinizing the "myth of the rational actor"). 
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attempts to maximize her own preferences by making rational 
choices among. options that are available to her. The 
dispositional/rational actor's preferences are thought, in our intuitions 
and in the model, to be "revealed" through the choices she freely 
makes, especially in market contexts?5 Such presumptions pervade 
the law and legal theory, which, together with much of our intuitive 
thinking about ourselves, may be described as unduly dispositionist 
in failing to perceive and comprehend the significance of situational 
influences on human behavior. 
In an effort to retire and replace the "rational actor" and its 
dispositionist cousins, and to fashion a more critically informed 
model of human behavior for use in legal theory, Professor Hanson 
and I introduced a figure that we call the "situational character.,,26 
The situational character encapsulates central lessons about human 
agency that emerge from the fields of social psychology, political 
theory, behavioralism, and economics, while highlighting the 
misconceptions that permeate so much conventional thinking about 
human behavior in lay and legal theoretic discourse.27 Our character 
derives from many overlapping areas of social scientific research, 
which we examine at length in The Situational Character: A Critical 
Realist Approach to the Human Animal.28 
A summary of some of the salient points of that Article serves as 
necessary background for this Article: We humans have limited 
perceptive and cognitive capacity.29 We take in and make sense of 
only limited aspects of the world around us.30 We have thus, of 
necessity, developed heuristics---(;ognitive "rules of thumb"-that 
"Behavioral law and economics" has emerged as a movement seeking to adapt 
some lessons of various social and psychological sciences to try to make the 
"rational actor" more realistic. In Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational 
Character, we argue that this work has been characterized by far-too dedicated 
a commitment to the basic rational actor model, and basic dispositionist 
presumptions. See id. (analyzing "Five Types ofInadequate Realism"). 
25. In economics, this is known as the "generalized axiom of revealed 
preferences." See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 
21 ,  at 152-70. 
26. See Hanson & Y osifon, The Situation, supra note 21,  at 1 49-79; see 
also Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 2 1 .  
27. Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 2 1 .  
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 1 52-54. 
30. Id. 
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allow us to make sense of the world and move in it without having to 
constantly perform an exhaustive analysis of what is actually going 
on in the world.3l These rules of thumb serve us well, but they are 
imperfect, and they lead to systematic biases in our thinking.32 
Among these biases, or, really, a way of theorizing across our 
aggregated biases, is dispositionism.33 Our conscious awareness is 
limited to a few highly salient features of the external world (most 
prominently, ourselves moving in it), and a few highly salient 
features of our inner lives (such as our conscious thoughts, 
preferences, and the experiences of will--collectively, our 
dispositions).34 Unless there is some highly salient situational 
influence clearly overbearing dispositional choice--a proverbial 
"gun to the head,,3s-we mistakenly attribute our own and other 
people's behavior to those limited features of our external and 
internal worlds of which we are consciously aware, to the exclusion 
of appreciating the ways in which we are moved by powerful 
situational influences in the world around us, and unseen features of 
the world within US.36 
Also fundamental to the situational character, yet absent both 
from the formal rational actor model and the intuitions behind the 
usually unnamed dispositional actor prevalent in conventional legal 
theory, are powerful internal motivations that shape our receipt and 
processing of information, and drive us towards opinions and 
behaviors in ways that we do not appreciate�37 We are motivated, for 
example, to view ourselves in a self-affirming fashion.38 We are 
further motivated, as social psychologists have well documented,l9 to 
view in an affirmative fashion the groups and social systems of 
3 1. Id. at 167-74. 
32. Id. at 1 57-66. 
33. Id. 
34� See BRUCE G. CHARLTON, PSYCHIATRY AND THE HUMAN CONDITION 
app. (2000) (discussing the evolution and cognitive neuroscience of awareness 
and consciousness). 
35. See, e.g. , Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 21, 
at 167-74 (developing the notion of highly salient situational influence through 
the use of a hypothetical situational character threatened by a gunman). 
36. See id. at 90-1 1 4  (reviewing dozens of social scientific experiments 
that reveal and elaborate these concepts). 
37. See id. 
3 8. See id. at 138. 
39. Id. 
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which we are a part.40 We tend to receive and process information in 
a manner that supports these motivations.41 They are a central and 
powerful feature of our inner lives and they continually give shape to 
our interactions �th the external world-but we are usually blind to 
them. Even as we engage in motivated reasoning regarding 
ourselves, our groups, and our social system, we believe ourselves to 
be reasoning objectively, fairly, and rationally.42 It is in this sense 
that these motivations are situational; though hidden, they constitute 
an influential aspect of our situational character.43 The fact that we 
tend not to appreciate the influence of these motivations on our 
thoughts and behaviors contributes substantially to our 
dispositionism.44 
Beneath these cognitive and motivational processes are deeply 
laden "visceral factors," which influence us profoundly, but which 
we tend not to see, or if we do see, often misunderstand. 45 Such 
visceral factors include our eating and sexual systems, and also, at a 
deeper remove, our experience of will.46 Consider the eating system, 
apropos as it is to the present inquiry.47 We humans tend to believe 
that our experience of hunger is directly related to our body's 
imminent need for food. We eat because we are hungry, and believe 
we feel hungry because we need to eat. But we are mistaken. 
40. See ZIVA KUNnA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 430 
(1999). 
41. See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 80-8 1 
(1991 ) (discussing the tendency of group members to develop "group-serving 
bias."). 
42. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 21 ,  at 
155-57. 
43. Internal situational influences such as motivations are particularly 
vulnerable to external situational manipulation, because their operation is 
largely hidden from our conscious scrutiny. See Broken Scales, supra note 3 ,  
at 1694-99 (describing specific examples of corporate manipulation of 
consumer motivations). 
44. See id. at 1708-1 1 .  
45. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 2 1 ,  at 
120-22 (discussing visceral factors). 
46. See id. at 128-33 (describing the experience of will as the crown-jewel 
of the dispositional self-conception); Broken Scales, supra note 3, at 1675-87 
(discussing the human eating system). 
47. Cf David Yosifon, The Costs of Pornography: Sexual Exploitation and 
Deep Capture (in progress) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) 
(analyzing the consumer market in pornography). 
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Scientists have demonstrated that our experience of hunger is large7s 
unrelated to our body's imminent or even short-tenn need for food. 8 
Instead, the syntptoms that we associate with the experience of 
hunger, for example a palpable drop in blood sugar, are actually 
caused by the body's eating system preparing itself for the 
anticipated intake of food, and the massive amount of blood sugar 
that comes with ,it.49 Thus, hunger is caused not so much by the 
body's need for food, but by the body's anticipation of eating. Now, 
scientists have also demonstrated that due to the fact that the problem 
of food scarcity has bedeviled human society throughout most of our 
history on Earth, we long-ago evolved eating systems that are 
oriented towards consuming as much food as possible, especially 
highly caloric food, whenever food is available, irrespective of the 
body's present energy needs. so The body stores excess energy as fat 
for use during lean times.Sl This may have served us well in times of 
food scarcity, but in the modern world, where for many food is made 
more or less constantly available, it can be powerfully misleading, 
even deadly. Visceral factors such as hunger and eating 
fundamentally shape our situational character, �et their influence is 
obscure to our intuitive experience of ourselves. 2 
The fact that situation is both highly influential and unseen 
suggests that where situation can be controlled, situational characters 
can be influenced in ways they will tend not to appreciate. Indeed, 
that this is true has been demonstrated time and time again in the 
hundreds of social scientific experiments revealing the features of the 
situational character just described, as well as many others. 53 Social 
scientists repeatealy and predictably manipulate the thoughts and 
behaviors of subjects in ways the subjects do not appreciate, often by 
taking advantage of one or another bias, motivation, or visceral 
48. John P.J. Pinel et aI., Hunger. Eating. and III Health, 55 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1 1 05, 1 1 1 1  (2000) (attributing self-regulation of eating to 
environmental factors). 
49. Blood sugar levels would become dangerously high if the body did not 
lower its blood sugar levels before the influx began. See Broken Scales, supra 
note 3, at 1681-84. 
50. [d. at 1675. 
5l. [d. 
52. See id. 
53. LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NESBm, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: 
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 66 ( 1991). 
I 
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factor that the scientist is exploring. 54 
Critical realism, having drawn on social science to establish this 
realistic conception of human agency, at this point turns to some 
highly probative principles of economics to make the prediction that 
while lay people are dispositionists, and while legal theorists have 
too often been dispositionist, market actors-i.e., corporations-will 
discover the truth about who we are and what moves us. 
Corporations will appreciate that we are situational characters 
because they have an enormous incentive to know, and a tremendous 
capacity to find out. 55 The competitive pressures of the market will 
compel profit-maximizing corporations to discover and exploit 
methods of exercising unseen situational influence over consumer 
behavior, in the same way that market forces compel firms to devise 
and employ the most efficient forms of business organization. 56 
Because the market will drive firms in this direction, rewarding with 
profit firms that do it and rendering bankrupt those that do not, 
corporations may come to engage in manipulative situational 
influence vis-a-vis consumers even without any human beings within 
the corporation consciously desiring to do so. Thus, in the context· 
under scrutiny here, competitive pressures will force firms selling 
junk food to discover and exploit ways of influencing junk-food 
consumption, even where individual corporations claim not to, or 
even where all corporate officers promise to espouse social 
responsibility in their business practices. Firms that fail to exploit 
opportunities for unseen situational influence over consumers will 
die out, those that even happen to stumble mistakenly on 
mechanisms of situational influence will thrive. Hanson and I call 
this process "pow'er economics. ,,57 
54. See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra 
note 21 (emphasizing throughout. that nearly every study reviewed suggests 
human vulnerability to unseen situational manipulation). 
55. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 21, at 219-23. 
56. See id. at 218. 
57. See id. at 193-201 (discussing power economics). Below I will argue 
that the problem presented by power economics militates in favor of a near 
total ban on junk-food advertising, rather than a ban on specific modes or 
methods of advertising. See infra Part 11.0. This is because power economics 
predicts that market forces will compel corporations to engage in manipulative 
practices even where the mechanics of such practices are not consciously 
understood or intentionally deployed by corporate managers. See infra Part 
II.C.2. 
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This approach thus predicts that corporations will strive to 
exercise unseen situational influence over consumers. Certainly such 
influence extends through the stimulation of consumption, as we 
shall soon see that it has in the junk-food market. But critical realism 
further predicts that one of the crucial ways that corporations will 
exercise situational influence is by cultivating, promoting, and 
entrenching dispositionism, to regulators, and to consumers 
themselves. While corporations appreciate the fact that people are 
situational characters, they have a great stake in widespread 
dispositionism, because it is this outlook that places responsibility for 
any bad outcomes associated with consumer behavior squarely on 
consumers themselves, rather than on the situational influences that 
may be driving that behavior. We call this process "deep capture. "S8 
Broken Scal�s was dedicated to elaborating these concepts and 
testing these predictions in the specific context of the obesity 
epidemic. S9 We examined in some detail the ways in which the food 
industry has powerfully shaped consumer behavior in this area, and 
how the industry has evaded responsibility for having done so by 
pursuing deep capture. 60 The present Article will next first further 
explore the nature of the obesity epidemic, specifically the 
relationship between junk-food advertising and childhood obesity. 
Thereafter, I proceed to the conceptual heart of the Article, which is 
an analysis, from' the critical realist perspective, of the constitutional 
issues implicated in what I propose would be one very effective 
regulatory response to the problem of childhood obesity-a 
legislative ban on junk-food advertising to children.61 
58. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 21 ,  at 202-30 
(describing the "deep capture" hypothesis). "Deep capture" is an extension of 
the concept of administrative "capture" in public-choice theory. Economists 
have long appreciated that industry often succeeds in influencing ("capturing") 
the administrative agencies charged with regulating industry conduct. 
Conventional capture theory, however, has failed to recognize that there are 
many more capture-worthy and capturable institutions that bear on corporate 
profit, not the least of which is consumers' conceptions of the sources of their 
own behavior. [d. For sources discussing conventional agency capture, see 
David B.  Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative 
State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 105 n. 37 (2000). 
59. Broken Scales, supra note 3, at 1648-54. 
60. ld. at 1689-1720. 
61 .  See infra Part 11.0. 
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2. Childhood Obesity and Junk-Food Advertising 
. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1 6  
percent of U.S. children ages 6 to 1 9-around 9 million children­
suffer from obesity.62 This is triple the rate of three decades ago, and 
the trend shows no signs of slowing.63 The obesity epidemic is 
bringing with it widespread human suffering-in the form of 
diabetes, diseases of the heart, liver, and kidneys, depression, and 
premature death, as well as an enormous social cost in terms of 
public healthcare expenditures dedicated to dealing with these 
conditions.64 • 
There are, no doubt, many contributing factors to the childhood 
obesity epidemic. To understand what part corporate behavior plays 
in it, we must understand that market forces compel successful firms 
in the junk-food industry to exploit any situational advantage they 
can to influence children to consume their productS.65 One very 
powerful method of situational influence that firms have at their 
disposal is advertising.66 The most widespread advertising method is 
the use of broadcast promotions on television for junk-food 
products.67 Billboard and print advertising in newsp�ers and 
magazines are other familiar and widespread methods. More 
recently, market �pressures have led to the creation of innovative 
forms of advertising, including in schools, on the Internet, through 
62. Prevalence and Trends in Overweight Among US Children and 
Adolescent. 1999-2000, 288 JAMA 1728, 1729 (2002). More than thirty 
percent of the adult population in the United States-sixty million people-is 
obese. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates the 
direct medical costs of overweight and obesity at almost ninety-three billion 
dollars per year, with about half of that being paid from public funds through 
government health care programs. Broken Scales, supra note 3, at 1 650-5 1 .  
65. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58 (making this argument). 
66. Of course, advertising is by no means the only mechanism by which the 
junk food industry exercises situational influence. Other methods involve 
making junk-food products. ubiquitously available to consumers, a ubiquity 
which shapes� and does not merely reflect, consumer preferences. See Broken 
Scales, supra note 3 ,  at 169 1-99. 
67. See id. at 1700-01 . 
68. See CMTY. ANtI-DRUG COAL. OF AMER. & CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. 
INTEREST, ALCOHOL ADVERTISING: ITS IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES, AND WHAT 
COALmONS CAN DO TO LESSEN THAT IMPACT, http://www.cspinet.org/ 
booze/Alcohol_Adverstising.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
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cell phones, and through product placement and promotion directly 
in the content of entertainment programming.69 Social scientists 
have been somewhat slow to study these innovative methods of 
advertising, slower, anyway, than corporations have been.7o There 
is, however, a formidable body of social science analyzing 
conventional methods of advertising to children, in particular 
television advertising.71 
Watching television has become "the dominant pastime of youth 
throughout the industrialised world."n Most of the $12 billion per 
year deployed by corporations in promoting junk food to children is 
spent on television advertising.73 Researchers estimate that children 
in the United States see between twenty thousand to forty thousand 
television commercials each year.74 The vast majority of these 
advertisements are for fast food, soft drinks, sugared cereal, and 
candy.75 The consensus among researchers, and the revealed opinion 
69. See generally BRIAN L. WILCOX ET AL., REpORT OF THE AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON ADVERTISING AND CHILDREN 
(2004), http://www.apa.org/pilcyf/advertisingandchildren.pdf (describing 
various ways advertisers target children). 
70. Id. at 9 (''Nearly all research on advertising to children involves studies 
of television, leaving us with little empirical knowledge about other 
commercial forms and contexts."). 
7 1 .  Id. The question of what constitutes advertising "directed at children," 
as distinct from advertising "directed at adults," is an important-and, I argue, 
vexing-question when it comes to the constitutional analysis of any ban that 
purports to forbid junk-food advertising to children but not to adults. For 
present purposes, however, the question may be held in abeyance and it will 
serve to follow the path broken by social scientists who have simply focused 
on the effects of advertising obviously directed at children. See. e.g., Krista 
Kotz & Mary Story, Food Advertisements During Children 's Saturday 
Morning Television Programming: Are They Consistent with Dietary 
Recommendations?, 94 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS'N 1 296, 1 296-1300 ( 1994) 
(analyzing the content of food advertisements during television programming 
aimed specifically at children). 
72. David S. Ludwig & Steven L. Gortmaker, Programming Obesity in 
Children, 364 LANCET 226 (2004) (collecting studies analyzing the 
relationship between television advertising and obesity in children). 
73. WILCOX ET AL., supra note 69, at 20. 
74. Mary Story & Simone French, Food Advertising and Marketing 
Directed at Children and Adolescents in the U.S. , 1 INT'L J. OF BEHAV. 
NUTRITION & PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 3 (2004). Children in low-income families 
have a higher exposure to food advertising because they tend to spend more 
time watching television than do their more affluent counterparts. [d. 
75. E. Katherine Battle & Kelly D. Brownell, Confronting a Rising Tide of 
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of profit-oriented market actors, is that television advertising 
contributes substantially to the heavy consumption of junk food on 
the part of children. 76 
. It is important to appreciate that television advertising 
contributes to childhood obesity in multiple ways. Perhaps most 
importantly, junk-food advertising alters children's diets by inducing 
preferences for junk-food consumption.77 Additionally, junk-food 
advertising contributes substantially to sedentary habits in children, 
which contribute to weight gain. 78 Advertising pays for the 
programming that draws children to the couch and away from more 
physically strenuous activity, so that they will be sitting more-or-less 
still when the programming is interrupted with advertising. Thus, 
television programs aimed at children are essentially advertisements 
for advertisements. That is the sense, undoubtedly, in which 
Eating Disorders and Obesity: Treatment vs. Prevention and Policy, 21 
ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 755, 761 ( 1 996). 
76. See Ludwig & Gortmaker, supra note 72. Though far out of the 
mainstream in this area, a few scholars have argued that food advertising has 
no adverse effect on children, and possibly serves useful purposes, and 
therefore should not be targeted for regulation in an effort to curb the obesity 
epidemic among children. See Todd J. Zywicki et al., Obesity and Advertising 
Policy 52 (George Mason Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 3,  
2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article= 
1 002&context=gmulwps. 
. 
77. See Dina L. G. Borzekowski & Thomas N. Robinson, The 30-Second 
Effect: An Experiment Revealing the Impact of Television Commercials on 
Food Preferences of Preschoolers, 101  J. AM. DIETETIC ASS'N 42, 42-46 
(2001 )  (showing that exposure to a 30-second food advertisement during the 
course of a TV program changed food preferences in preschool children); id. at 
42 (finding that in the two weeks following watching particular television 
advertising, 67% of Latino preschool subjects asked to be taken to the 
particular restaurant or store shown in the commercials and 55% requested a 
featured food or drink). Of course, children are often fed by their parents. 
However, this has not stopped corporations from marketing junk food products 
directly to children, as marketers have extensively studied the power of 
advertising to induce children to "nag" their parents incessantly to feed them 
the advertised junk food. See Broken Scales, supra note 3 ,  at 1 70�7. 
Children's direct purchasing power has also increased substantially in recent 
decades, such that children often purchase and consume junk food without 
parental intervention. One study estimated that children fourteen years old and 
younger are directly responsible for $24 billion in purchases annually, and 
influence over $190 billion in family purchases annually. WILCOX ET AL., 
supra note 69, at 20-2 1 .  
78. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, POLL: LACK OF EXERCISE BLAMED FOR KID 
OBESITY, available at http://msnbc.com/idl98 120951. 
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children's progr3rnming is understood by the food industry.79 
Studies also show that children, like adults, often eat while watching 
television, food that would likely not be consumed were they 
engaged in some other activity.8o 
Just how does exposure to junk-food advertising lead to the 
consumption of junk food by children? The process is somewhat 
opaque. What is clear, however, is that the process does not 
resemble the stylized picture of a rational actor gathering and 
responding to infonnation about the availability and price of a good 
for which the actor has a pre-existing preference.8 ) The findings in 
this area are much more consistent with a situational character-type 
conception of agency and consumer behavior.82 As a recent 
commission report of the American Psychological Association 
summarized: 
Commercials are highly effective at employing production 
conventions, or fonnal features, to attract children's 
attention, such as unique sound effects and auditory 
changes, rapidly moving images, and audiovisual gimmicks 
and special effects. 
. . .  [A]dvertising to children avoids any appeal to the 
rational, emphasizing instead that ads are entertainment and 
'enjoyable for their own sake,' as opposed to providing any 
real consumer infonnation. The most common persuasive 
strategy employed in advertising to children is to associate 
the product with fun and happiness, rather than to provide 
any factual product-related infonnation. For example, a 
commercial featuring Ronald McDonald dancing, singing, 
and smiling in McDonald's restaurants without any mention 
of the actual food products available reflects a 
fun/happiness theme. This strategy is also found frequently 
79. Thus, the junk-food industry's claim that it is sedentary lifestyles, rather 
than food consumption habits, that is responsible for childhood obesity would 
not, even if it were true, absolve the industry of responsibility for the epidemic. 
See Broken Scales, supra note 3 at 1727--68 (reviewing industry arguments). 
80. See Ludwig & Gortmaker, supra note 72. 
8 1 .  See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 2 1 ,  at 1 54--60 
(reviewing presumptions underlying conventional conceptions of human 
behavior, with particular reference to the rational actor model in law and 
economics). 
82. See id. at 1 54--60, 265. 
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with cereal ads, which often include spokes-characters (e.g., 
Tony the Tiger, Cap'n Crunch) to help children identify the 
product. In contrast, most commercials fail to mention even 
the major grain used in each cereal . . . .  83 
Some researchers have argued that junk-food advertising makes 
use of deeply ingrained information-transmitting cues through which 
human young haye, from time immemorial, learned what foods are 
beneficial to eat, and which are to be avoided: "[T]he themes 
emphasized in television advertisements for foods appear to be 
providing information that once served as a signal of nutritional 
value. , ,84 Such cues, which have been shown to be influential in the 
development of eating habits in other mammals, involve themes such 
as food being fought over, or the consumption of a food item being 
accompanied by exaggerated visible signs of enjoyment, as well as 
of health and vitality genera1ly.8s When children respond to such 
cues and consume the advertised foods, they encounter foods that are 
filled with salt, sugar, and fat, precisely the kinds of highly caloric 
foods our evolutionarily betrothed eating systems are oriented 
towards consuming in large amounts when they are available.86 
Unfortunately, such foods, which were available only intermittently 
in the natural conditions under which our eating systems evolved, are 
today made ubiquitously available to children by the food industry, 
not just in grocery stores, but in schools, shopping centers, gasoline 
stations, and any other place corporations can reach.87 
Much of the research in this area has focused on tracking 
children's own conscious understanding of the advertisements they 
see. Such studies have established that "young children have little 
understanding of the persuasive intent of advertising. ,,88 Children 
begin to understand advertising intent around the age of seven or 
eight. Preteens, this research suggests, "possess the cognitive ability 
83. WILCOX ET AL., supra note 69, at 23-24 (citation omitted). 
84. Trenton G. Smith, The McDonald's Equilibrium: Advertising, Empty 
Calories, and the Endogenous Determination of Dietary Preferences, 23 SOC. 
CHOICE & WELFARE 383, 404 (2004). 
85. See id. 
86. See id. at 405-06. 
87. See Broken Scales, supra note 3 at 1675-89 (describing "The Interior 
Situation of the Human Eating System," with special reference to evolutionary 
biology). 
88. Story & French, supra note 74, at 3 .  
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to process advertisements but do not necessarily do so. ,,89 These 
findings, to be sure, provide important evidence of the unseen 
influence of junk-food advertising on children. But the importance 
of such findings to the overall analytic project underway in this 
article should not be overstated. Even though adults may recognize 
the persuasive intent of advertisements, that does not mean that the 
advertisements do not influence adults in ways they do not 
appreciate. Indeed, advertising's powerful grip on adults is bolstered 
by the irony that most adults believe advertising probably 
manipulates other consumers, but not themselves.9o While it is cause 
for concern that children do not recognize the persuasive intent of 
junk-food advertising, the recognition of such intent is hardly 
conclusive with respect to the unseen power of advertising to 
manipulate consumer behavior. 
C. The Inadequacy of the Present Regulatory Framework 
In light of the foregoing, it may come as a surprise to learn that 
junk-food advertising, even junk-food advertising directed at 
children, is almost entirely unregulated. The following sections will 
describe important aspects of the regulations that do exist, with 
emphasis given to the regime established by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), the principle federal agency concerned with 
regulating advertising. Many state-based regulatory efforts are 
modeled on the FTC's approach, which is itself built on a general 
framework derived from familiar common law principles.91 I will 
argue that the FTC-type approach is grossly inadequate to the task of 
soundly regulating junk-food advertising, in large measure because 
of the strong dispositionist presumptions that the framework 
employs. I explore this argument through an examination of the 
legal concept of "puffery," and the central part that doctrines such as 
"puffery" play in insulating the pernicious effects of junk-food 
advertising from the reach of extant statutory and common law 
regulation. 
89. Id. 
90. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 21 ,  at 
228. 
9 1 .  See infra text accompanying notes 122-1 33. 
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; 1 .  The Basic FTC Framework 
Established in 1 9 1 4  as a centerpiece of the Roosevelt 
administration's antitrust legislation, the FTC is one of the oldest 
administrative agencies of the federal government.92 The agency's 
enabling legislation gave it the power to prohibit "unfair methods of 
competition, ,,93 but initially contained no specific reference to 
protecting consumers against deceptive trade practices.94 Agency 
administrators, however, soon came to see consumer deception as an 
important form of unfair competition. A company that deceives 
customers, the FTC reasoned, competed unfairly against a competitor 
that does not.9S With the courts divided over whether consumer 
deception was within the ambit of the agency's regulatory power, 
Congress in 1 93 8  stepped in and formally granted the FTC the power 
to prohibit "deceptive acts or practices. ,,96 The same le�islation 
specifically empowered the FTC to regulate food advertising. 7 
Despite its mandate officially expanding throughout the 1 940s 
and 1 950s, the agency, by the end of the 1 960s, came under 
withering criticism from both consumer groups and legal scholars as 
being inefgt, polluted by patronage, and captured by industry 
influence. 8 In the . 1 970s the agency enjoyed a brief period of 
resurgence, in part as a result of internal reforms adopted in response 
92. MARY DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 8:2 
(2004). 
93. Id. 
94. See, e.g. , FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (193 1); FTC v. Winsted 
Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307 
(7th Cir. 1919). 
95. PRIDGEN, supra note 92, at § 8:2. 
96. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), Pub. L. No. 447, 52 Stat. I I I  
(1 938). For a detailed legislative history of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment, see 
EARL KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 4807--46 (Chelsea House Publishers 1 982) 
(1978). 
97. KINTNER, supra note 96, at 4812. The FTC regulates food advertising, 
while the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for food 
labeling. See Working Agreement Between the FTC and FDA, 3 Trade Reg. 
Rep. (CCH) , 9851 (1971). 
98. See, e.g. , EDWARD F. COX ET AL., "THE NADER REPORT" ON THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1 969) (examining the failures of the FTC in 
their management of resources and funds); Richard Posner, The Federal Trade 
Commission, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 47 (1969). 
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to the criticism it had sustained in the preceding decade.99 At 
perhaps the zenith of this surge, the FTC in the late 1 970s undertook 
to ban advertising directed at children altogether. 100 
The FTC staff report that proposed such a ban drew heavily on 
social scientific study of the influence of advertising on the 
consumfttion behavior of children, some of which was summarized 
above. I I The report argued that the cognitive immaturity of children 
made advertising1directed at them inherently deceptive: 
[C]hildren are at the opposite pole, psychologically, 
intellectually and economically, from the traditionally 
assumed 'rational consumer' for whom advertising provides 
a service, by offering him or her information relevant to 
logical market behavior. Children too young to understand 
even the concept of a market in which products compete are 
also too young to understand that a decision to consume any 
product may imply a decision not to consumer some other 
product, or to forgo some other benefit. The classical 
justification for a free market, and for the advertising that 
goes with it, assumes at least a rough balance of 
information, sophistication and power between buyer and 
seller . . .. [I]t is ludicrous to suggest that any such balance 
exists between an advertiser who is willing to spend many 
thousands of dollars for a single 30-second spot, and a child 
who is incapable of understanding that the spot has a selling 
intent, and instead trustingly believes that the spot merely 
provides advfce about one of the good things in life. l02 
. Intense Congressional lobb�ing by the food industry succeeded 
in scuttling the FTC proposal. I 3 Congress, which has a history of 
withholding funds from the FTC when it disapproves of the agency's 
99. See PRIDGEN, supra note 92, § 8:2. 
100. See ELLIS M. RATNER ET AL., FTC STAFF REpORT ON TELEVISION 
ADVERTISING TO ClllLDREN 10- 1 1  ( 1978). The report itself is based on more 
than 60,000 pages of testimony on. the issue of commercial advertising to 
children. Id. 
10 1 .  See id. ; see also supra Part II.D. 
102. RATNER ET AL., supra note 100, at 28-29. Interestingly, childhood 
obesity was not yet a major problem in the 1 970s; the major health problem 
that the FTC . identified in connection with junk-food advertising to children 
was tooth decay. See id. at 1 19-4 1 .  
103. See Story & French, supra note 74, at 12-1 3 .  
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actions, refused the FTC funds to so much · as hold a hearing on its 
proposal. 104 And just in . case the FTC failed to get the message, 
Congress passed the FTC Improvements Act of 1980, which 
"specifically prohibited any further action to adopt the proposed 
children's advertising rules,,, 105 and imposed on the agency "a three­
year · moratorium on the promulgation of rules against unfair 
advertising.,, 106 Perhaps even more importantly, Congress also 
forbade the FTC from imposing industry-wide regulations regarding 
deceptive advertising practices in 1 980, requiriny the agency instead 
to make determinations on a case-by-case basis. 07 This prohibition 
lasted until legislation re-authorizing the FTC as a federal agency 
removed the restriction in 1 993.108 In 1 990, Congress .passed the 
Children's Television Act;09 which required the FTC to promulgate 
regulations that ;'limit[ ed] the amount of commercial time during 
children's programming to 1 0.5 [minutes per hour] on weekends and 
12 [minutes per hour] on weekdays." l lo These restrictions remain in 
place. I I I  
The FTC haS today adopted a "partnership" model of regulating 
advertising · to children, purporting to work co-operatively with 
industry to advance its mission of preventing deceptive advertising. 
In July of 2005, responding to the growing visibility of the childhood 
104. The FTC enabling legislation fonnerly contained a provision allowing 
Congress to veto any regulatory act with which it disagreed; however, the 
United States Supreme Court deemed the provision unconstitutional. See 
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 
1216 (1 983). See generally INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 9 19  (1 983) (holding 
legislative vetos unconstitutional on separation-of-powers grounds). 
105. Story & French, supra note 74, at 1 3 .  
106; PRIDGEN, supra note 92, § 8:2, see also 1 5  U.S.C. § 57a-l (1 982) 
(providing Congress with final review of rules promulgated by the FTC). The 
congressional response to the proposed regulations was no doubt one part 
capture and one part deep capture. Cf Broken Scales, supra note 3 ,  at 1724-
26 (examining the ' conjunction of capture and deep capture in legislative 
proposals to halt tort suits against the fast food industry for consumer harms). 
107. 1 5  U.S.C. § 57(a)(i). . 
108. See Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-3 1 2, 108 Stat. 1 691 ,  1695. 
109. Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 303(b), 394 (2000» . 
1 1 0. Story & French, supra note 74, at 1 2  tbl.6. 
1 1 1 . See id. 
HeinOnline -- 39 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 529 2006
May 2006] RESISTING DEEP CAPTURE 529 
obesity epidemic� 1 12 the FTC held a "public workshop" on the issue 
in Washington, D.C. Reflecting its partnership.·approach, the agency 
titled the workshop "Marketing, Self-Regulation, and Childhood 
Obesity. " l l3 The workshop served to highlight the FTC's present 
regulatory appetite, or lack thereof, for . regulating junk-food 
advertising. The. emphasis of the workshop was . "on industry self­
regulatory efforts, and . . .  recent initiatives by individual companies 
to respond to childhood obesity through changes in their products or 
their marketing efforts. ,, 1 14 Prior to the workshop, FTC Chair 
Deborah Platt Majoras released remarks stating: "I want to be clear 
that, from the FTC's perspective, this is not the first step toward new 
government regulations to ban or restrict children's food advertising 
and marketing. The FTC tried that approach in the 1 970s, and it 
failed for good reasons." l l S 
2. The Problem with the Present Regulatory Approach 
Because Congress prohibited the FTC from developing a general 
ban on advertising to children, 1 1 6  the regulation of such advertising 
has been left to the FTC's general power to regulate deceptive 
advertising on a case-by-case basis. Although the case-by-case 
\ 
review method is vulnerable to criticism from a number of 
programmatic and theoretical perspectives, I will focus here on the 
profound inadequacy of the standard that the FTC employs in cases 
where it does act. 
1 12. In the last several years, public health advocates, scholars, filmmakers, 
and the media have . paid increasing attention to the obesity crisis. See Broken 
Scales, supra note 3, at 1746-56 (discussing the movie "Supersize Me" and 
media response to it). 
1 1 3 .  Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Obesity Liability Conference 8 (May 
1 1 , 2005) (on file with author)." The workshop was co-sponsored by the 
Department of Health and Human Services. Id. 
1 14. Majoras, supra note 1 1 3, at 8. 
1 1 5. Id. Majoras continued: 
[d. 
I would like to emphasize the potential for advertising to be a positive 
force in this area. I am sure that no one in this room doubts the power 
of advertising to shape consumer demand and choices. Similarly, the 
FTC is a big believer in advertising as a promoter of competition in 
our free market society. 
1 16. See supra text accompanying notes 104-1 1 1 . 
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In response to congressional · inquiry, the FTC in 1 983 produced 
a "Policy Statement on · Deception" (hereinafter, the "Deception 
Statement"), which purported to articulate the industry's views on the 
concept of deception so as "to provide a concrete indication of the · 
manner . in which the COmniission [would] enforce its deception 
mandate." I 17 The Deception . Statement brought together standards 
developed during the FTC's decades long enforcement record, and 
the statement has, since 1 983, served as the central analytic 
guidepost in subsequent agency actions. I I S According to the 
Deception Statement, for an advertisement, or any trade practice, to 
be "deceptive" within the meaning of Section 5 of the FTC Act, 
"there must be a representation, omission or practice that is likely to 
mislead the consumer. ,, 1 I9 Importantly, a misleading statement only 
constitutes deception if it is "material,,, 120 that is, if it is "likely to 
affect the consumer's conduct or decision with regard to a product or 
service. ,, 12 1 Reflecting the common law standards on which it is 
based, the Deception Statement purports to modulate its standard 
based on the intended target of an advertisement: "When 
representations or sales practices are targeted to a specific audience, 
such as children, the elderly, or the terminally ill, the Commission 
determines the effect of the practice on a reasonable member of that 
group. ,, 122 
The fundamental inadequacy of the FTC approach, and similar 
state law approaches to advertising regulation, is their misguided 
adherence to common law, and common sense, notions of what is 
"likely to affect consumer[] conduct.,, 123 To appreciate how, 
consider the ope�ation of a central legal concept in both FTC and 
common law jurisprudence: the doctrine of "puffery." 
1 1 7. Letter from James C. Miller, III, Chairman of the FTC, to John D. 
Dingell, Chairman of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, U.S. House of 
Representatives (Oct. 1 4, 1 983), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/ 
policystmtlad-decept.htm. 
1 1 8. The 1993 FTC reauthorization act gave legislative imprimatur to the 
view of deception expressed in the Letter from James C. Miller, III., to John D. 
Dingell, supra note 1 18, See PRIDGEN, supra note 92, at § 8:2. 
1 1 9. Letter from James C. Miller, III., to John D. DingeU, supra note 1 17. 
120. Id. 
12 1 .  Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
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"Puffery" refers to a nebulous but broad category of hyperbole 
and bluster that in the eyes of the law does not constitute false or 
misieading . advertising because "no reasonable consumer relies upon 
it.'il24 . For example, advertising stating that a pasta manufacturer's 
product was "America's Favorite Pasta," was un-actionable puffery, 
despite the fact that there was no evidence that the pasta was, in fact, 
America's favorite. 125 By operation of the doctrine, a pizza company 
promoting its product as comprising "Better Ingredients. Better 
Pizza," even when compared to other pizza brands, could not be 
made to answer for a cause of action based in consumer deception. 126 
A video game company promoting its product as "the most advanced 
home-gaming system in the universe," even though other systems 
were more advanced, could not be made to answer for a claim based 
on misleading consumers. 127 More generally, advertising which 
associates a particular product with exaggerated excitement, health 
and vitality, fun, and happiness is considered puffery, and therefore 
irrelevant to consumer deception concerns.128 A classic explanation 
of the doctrine co:mes, as usual, from Judge Learned Hand: 
There are some kinds of talk which no sensible man takes 
seriously, and if he does he suffers from his credulity. If we 
124. Rodney A. Smolla, Free the Fortune 500! The Debate over Corporate 
Speech and the First Amendment, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1277, 1279 n. 12. 
(2004) (defining puffery). 
125. Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 37 1 F.3d 387, 391-92 
(8th Cir. 2004). 
126. Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 498-99 (5th Cir. 
2000). 
127. Atari Corp. v. 3DO Co., No. C 94-20298 RMW (EAI), 1994 WL 
723601 (N.D. CaL, May 16 1994). 
128. See, e.g. , Goodwin v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., 2005 WL 280330 
(Cal. Super. Ct. 2005) ("[p]laintiffs do not identify any advertising that is 
misleading or false. Instead the plaintiffs focus on puffery or on qualities that 
are not affirmations of fact such as the fun, sexiness, popUlarity, social 
acceptance, athleticism, etc. that drinking alcohol can bring. This is not 
actionable . . . .  "). Professor Ivan L. Preston identifies several different 
categories of advertising claims that are considered un-actionable as a matter 
of law, including "puffery," "obviously false claims," and "lifestyle claims," 
which he refers to collectively as "loophole . claims." See Ivan L. Preston, 
Puffery and Other '!Loophole " Claims: How the Law 's 'Don 't Ask, Don 't tell ' 
Policy Condones Fraudulent Falsity in Advertising, 1 8  J.L. & COM. 49, 54-74 
(1 998). I make use of Preston's excellent analysis infra text accompanying 
notes 133-14 1 ,  but I maintain the convention of referring broadly to all such 
"loophole claims" as "puffery." 
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were all scrupulously honest, it would not be so; but, as it 
is, neither party usually believes what the seller says about 
his own opinions, and each knows it. 129 . 
The FTC embraces the puffery doctrine: 
Certain practices . . .  are unlikely to deceive · ' consumers 
. acting reasonably. Thus, the Commission generally will not 
bring advertising cases based on subjective claims (taste, 
feel, appearance, smell) or on correctly stated opinion 
claims if cOJ;lsumers understand the source and limitations 
of the opinion . . . .  
The Commission generally will not pursue cases involving 
obviously exaggerated or puffing representations, i. e. , those that the 
ordinary consumers do not take seriously. 13o While both the FTC 
and the common law purport to evaluate the deceptiveness of 
advertising from the perspective of its target audience, 13 the doctrine 
of puffery appears to be no less expansively applied to advertising 
directed at children as it is to advertising generally. 132 
Despite its familiarity and force, the doctrine of puffery, is 
shabbily under-theorized. Commentators have found the doctrine to 
be highly problematic, both analytically and empirically. 1 33 The idea 
that statements constituting puffery do not influence consumer 
behavior or decision-making is given the lie by the fact that a 
1 29. Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853, 856 (2d Cir. 
1918); see also Cook, Perkiss & Liehe Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 
91 1 F.2d 242, 246 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Puffing has been described by most courts 
as involving outrageous statements, not making specific claims, that are so 
exaggerated as to preclude reliance by consumers."). 
1 30. Letter from James C. Miiler, 1II., to John D. Dingell, supra note 1 1 7. 
1 3 1. See id. 
1 32. See, e.g.,  Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 5 12, 530 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("In any case, if plaintiffs are only concerned about the 
appellation 'Mightier Kids Meal,' such [a] name is seemingly mere puffery, 
rather than any claim that children who eat a 'Mightier Kids Meal' will 
become mightier."). 
1 33 . .  Jean W. Bums, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the 
Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REv. 807, 835, 846-73 (1999) (finding courts 
inconsistently define "puffery"); Richard J. Leighton, Materiality and Puffing 
in Lanham Act False Advertising Cases: The Proofs, Presumptions, and 
Pretexts, 94 TRADEMARK REp. 585 (2004) (examining the puffery doctrine). 
See generally Preston, supra note 128 (analyzing the court's historical 
treatment of puffery and its subsequent evolution into loophole claims allowed 
by the FTC). 
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substantial proportion of contemporary advertising consists of 
nothing but puffery. If puffery were as inconsequential as the 
puffery doctrine holds it to be, then profit-maximizing corporations 
would not engage in it-firms that wasted money on it would be 
quickly subsumed by those that did not. And, sure enough, empirical 
evidence reveals that advertising conventionally categorized as 
"puffery" does indeed influence the behavior of ordinary consumers, 
epigrammatic 
. 
protestations to the contrary by Judge Hand 
notwithstanding. 134 
Ivan L. Preston has studied the FTC's advertising review process 
extensively and :argues that uncritical acceptance of the puffery 
doctrine has seriously undermined the agency's effectiveness: 
[FTC practice] does not fully reflect the FTC's policy 
statements on puffery, which define the concept as claims 
consumers see as meaningless, thus impliedly requiring 
determination of the latter. . . .  Staff practice, however, 
does not involve investigation into consumer response; 
rather, it appears to involve only examination of the words, 
followed by decisions that claims having semantic forms 
previously ruled to be puffery, are puffery. If the claim is 
puffery semantically and is unaccompanied by questionable 
fact claims, it is virtually assumed automatically at the 
investigation stage to be meaningless and, thus, to be 
puffery in fact . . .  leading to the conclusion again and again 
that consumers understand these claims as meaningless and 
. so cannot be deceived. 135 
From the critical realist perspective, one would anticipate that 
consumers would be susceptible to influence through advertising 
practices that dispositionist presumptions would lead us to consider 
innocuous, but which market practices suggest is efficacious. And 
I 
this is in fact what social scientific study of "mere puffery" has 
found. Indeed, "no behavioral studies have reported the finding, 
assumed by the law, that consumers �ically see puffery and other 
loophole claims as meaningless." 13 One empirical study of 
134. See Preston, supra note 128. 
135. Id. at 62. 
1 36. Id. at 82-83 ; see also Bruce G. Vanden Bergh & Leonard N. Reid, 
Effects of Product. Puffery on Response to Print Advertisements, 1980 
CURRENT ISSUES &, REs. ADVERTISING, 123; Bruce G. Vanden Bergh & 
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consumer thinking, for example, 
surveyed a sample of citizens on whether they felt various 
. advertising claims were "completely true," "partly true," or 
"not true at all." The puffery claims among them were rated · 
as follows: "State Farm is all you need to know about life 
insurance" (22 percent said completely true, 36 percent said 
partly true); "The world's most experienced airline" (Pan 
Am) (23 percent and 47 percent respectively); "Ford has a 
better idea" (26 percent and 42 percent); "You can trust 
your car to the man who wears the star" (Texaco) (21 
percent and 47 percent);"It's the real thing" (Coca-Cola) (35 
percent and 29 percent); "Perfect rice everytime" (Minute 
Rice) (43 percent and 30 percent) . . .  Alcoa's claim, 
"Today, aluminum is something else," [was] appraised as 
completely true by 47 percent and partly true by 36 
percent. 137 . 
Each of these statements is posed in a form that would be 
captured by the puffery doctrine. As Preston concluded, " [h]ad 
people responded as the law assumes, they would all have answered 
'not true at all.'" 138 Note that the study quoted above was conducted 
not by academics, but by advertising experts seeking to understand 
what was and was not working in the advertising they produced. 139 
Through such inquiry, market actors have developed a much clearer 
understanding of what influences consumers than the law does, 
which continues to view "mere puffery" through the lens of intuition 
and common sense. 140 
Leonard N.  Reid, Puffery and Magazine Ad Readership, 44 J. MARKETING 78 
(1980) (finding consumers do not necessarily consider puffery meaningless); 
Morris B .  Holbrook, Beyond Attitude Structure: Toward the Informational 
Determinants of Attitude, 1 5  J. MARKETING REs. 545 (1978); Jerry C. Olson & 
Philip A. Dover, Cognitive Effects of Deceptive Advertising, 1 5  J. MARKETING 
REs. 29 (1978); Herbert J. Rotfeld & Kim B. Rotzoll, Is Advertising Puffery 
Believed?, 9 J. ADVERTISING 16, 1 8  (1980). 
1 37. Preston, supra note 128, at 80-81 (citing Conswner Confidence-Signs 
of an Upturn, BRUSKIN REpORT (R.H. Bruskin Associates, New Brunswick, 
N.J.), May 1971 ,  at 2). 
138. [d. 
1 39 . . See id. 
140. Another interesting study suggests that "puffery" may even 
meaningfully influence consumer behavior where the "meaningless" natUre of 
the puffery in a given advertisement is highlighted. 1d. at 83. After surveyed 
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The enormoils spending on "puffery" would be an enormous 
waste of corporate resources if these types of advertisements were as 
meaningless as the law presumes. Nevertheless, when challenged, 
corporations are quick to raise the puffery defense in their motions 
and briefs. Because of the power of the puffery doctrine to repel 
scrutiny of' the real power of much advertising, it is difficult to find 
evidence beyond corporate practice alone evidencing corporate 
understanding of just how manipulative puffing can be over 
consumer behavior. However, corporate submissions to the FTC's 
recent workshop on the childhood obesity epidemic ironically 
provides revealing evidence of the fact that corporations are capable, 
and know they are capable, of influencing consumption through 
puffing. 141 
General Mills, Inc., in a written submission to the workshop, 
endeavored to explain that it has responded responsibly to the 
childhood obesity epidemic, in part, by marketing healthier foods to 
children (thus, General Mills concluded, no further regulation by the 
FTC was necessary). 142 For present purposes, what is important 
about General Mill's argument is its admission concerning the power 
of puffing. In a ;  section titled "Yogurt consumption by kids-how 
General Mills accelerated kid adoption of a healthful product by 
marketing the concept of fun (and not particular health benefits) 
consumers were informed that certain advertised product attributes were 
meaningless-for example, that "flaked crystals" were irrelevant to the brew 
quality of instant coffee-,..consumer preferences nevertheless continued to be 
shaped favorably by the presence of such irrelevant information. Id. That is, 
consumers who were first exposed to advertisements promoting a coffee 
product having "flaked crystals" and were then told that "flaked crystals" are 
irrelevant to the quality of coffee, still had a greater preference for the coffee 
than did consumers who were exposed to ads that did not portray the coffee as 
having "flaked crystals" at all. Id. Information that was meaningless, 
therefore, influenced consumer behavior even after they were alerted to its 
meaninglessness. Id. The FTC and most common law courts, however, would 
begin and end with the legal conclusion that such meaningless statements had 
no effect on consumer behavior. See id. at 84. 
141 .  See supra text accompanying notes . 1 1 3-1 1 5( discussing FTC 
chairperson's comments in conjunction with the workshop). 
142; Letter from Kendall J. Powell, Executive Vice President and Chief 
Operating Officer, General Mills, to Donald S. Clark, Sec'y, Fed. Trade 
Comm'n, General Mills Submission to FTC Obesity Conference (June 8, 
2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/commentslFoodMarketingtoKids/ 
51 6960-00028.pdf. ' 
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directly to kids,,, 143 General Mills wrote: 
. Not too many years ago, American kids did not eat much 
yogurt. General Mills set out to change that-. not by 
. .  directly telling kids that eating yogurt would be better for 
them than other common snack foods (like cookies and 
candy) . . .  but by making yogurt fun and appealing. 
Among other important initiatives to encourage this, we 
. introduced Go-Gurt (a squeezable tube of yogurt suitable 
for snacking on the go) and Trix yogurt (a conventional cup 
yogurt branded in an appealing way), and supported these 
products with appealing advertising emphasizing an 
association between fun and yogurt. Adoption of these 
products by kids in response to the marketing has been 
impressive. In a 2005 survey of kids who consume yogurt, 
76% said they like Go-Gurt and 74% said they like Trix, on 
par with the liking scores of longstanding and dominant 
products like Popsicles (77%) and Oreos (74%) . . . .  
Thus, effective marketing of these kid-oriented yogurt 
products has essentially created a product category that did 
not formerly exist, encouraging kids to more often choose 
nutrient-dense yogurt as a healthful snack, providing kids 
with calcium and protein without much sodium or fat. 144 
General Mills is here trumpeting the ease with which it was able 
to induce children's consumption of yogurt by advertising methods 
that are, in consumer protection doctrine, non-influential as a matter 
of law. Because it can exercise this power, General Mills argues, 
any expansion of the FTC's regulation of junk-food advertising to 
children is unnecessary. Surely the opposite conclusion is more 
logical-namely that puffery is powerful, and that the conventional 
regulatory framework, which does not regulate it, is inadequate. 
General Mills has clearly engaged in extensive empirical study 
of how to puff effectively. The statistics cited above are referenced 
by a footnote to a study called the "General Mills Attitude and Usage 
Study, February \ 2003 ,,, 145 which indicates that General Mills is 
engaging in precisely the kind of social scientific study that has 
143. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
1 44. Id. at 3-4. 
145. Id. at 3 n.5 . The underlying study is not publicly available. 
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among academic social scientists, though typically not legal scholars 
or jurists, revealep the power of puffing. Undoubtedly General Mills 
uses the same advertising tactics to promote foods that are far less 
healthy than yogurt, such as its "Lucky Charms" cereals. The "fun · 
and appealing" antics of "Lucky the Leprechaun" no doubt influence 
consumer behavior in much the same way that General Mills's 
promotion of "Go-gurt" does, that is, by associating the product with 
"fun" and "magic," matters that are attractive to children:46 Yet the 
connection between the "fun" and the product is dismissed as un­
actionable "puffery" in the eyes of the law. 147 · 
"Puffery" is a legal doctrine that rests on a demonstrably false 
conception of human thinking and decision-making. It is 
dispositionist dogma, steeped in intuition and devoid of any social 
scientific justification. Far from being a quaint or marginal doctrine, 
puffery reflects an abiding ignorance, at the heart of contemporary 
consumer protection law, of unconscious psychological processes, 
and non-obvious influences on human behavior. What the law does 
not appreciate, and what it must grapple with for an effective remedy 
to the problem of junk-food advertising to children to be fashioned, 
is that advertising influences consumers in ways that common 
sense-both of the consumer and the regulator-is not likely to 
appreciate. Junk�food advertising, ubiquitously deployed by profit­
seeking corporations, associating fun, magic, health and vitality with 
junk-food consumption, for example, may mislead people with 
respect to their perception and conception of the health consequences 
of frequent junk-food consumption, in ways common sense fails to 
see. 148 Many advertising methods and themes used to sell junk food, 
1 46. See General Mills, Home Page, http://www.generalmills.comlcorporate/ 
index.aspx (last visited July 22, 2005); Lucky Charms Magical Realm, 
http://www.luckycharmsfun.millsberry.coml (last visited July 22, 2005). 
147. Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 656 N.E.2d 170, 1 83 (Ill. App. ct. 1 995) 
(describing representations of a "funmobile," with "fun written all over it" as 
non-actionable puffery), overruled on other grounds by Connick v. Suzuki 
Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584 (Ill. 1996) . . 
1 48. The manipulation of consumer risk perception is just one way that 
junk-food advertising can mislead consumers. As discussed earlier, some 
researchers argue that junk-food advertising exploits signaling cues that have 
guided human eating patterns-and those of our fellow mammals-for many 
thousands of years, long before the emergence of civilization. See supra text 
accompanying notes 54-60. Junk food advertising that deploys these cues 
may give shape to eating habits that are debilitating, by misleading ancient 
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that are viewed as unproblematic throu�h the traditional normative 
lens, may actually be very problematic. 14 . 
. 
D. A Proposal to Ban Junk-Food Advertising to Children 
. . In light of the foregoing, it seems that a fairly dramatic overhaul 
of the present regulatory approach may be needed to stem the tide of 
the childhood obesity epidemic. . I propose that one innovative 
response to the problem would be to implement a near total ban on 
junk-food advertising to children. I SO 
One approach to such a ban would be to target only junk-food 
advertising directed solely at children, or methods that appeal solely 
to children, and exempt advertising to adults . Such a ban, however, 
would only capture a very narrow category of advertising, if any at 
all. Adults are nearly always present in communicative venues 
where children are present, and communicative occasions where only 
adults are allowed are very limited. Thus, any effective effort to 
insulate children from junk-food advertising would necessarily 
effectuate a substantial limitation on the advertising of junk food to 
adults. A ban on:junk-food advertising to children must therefore be 
conceived of, programmatically and analytically, as a near total ban 
on junk-food advertising to adults, as well as to children. As will be 
cues oriented towards signaling eating habits that would aid human 
thriving. , 
149. Calling something "misleading" is ultimately a legal conchision, just as 
assigning "causation" is, in the end, a legal conclusion. Legal economists, for 
example, were interested in observing-and imposing-efficiency in legal 
rules, and so for them "causation" in, say, a torts context would be located 
where necessary to make the least cost avoider of harm take the appropriate 
precautions. 'See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Responsibility, Causation, and the 
Harm-Benefit Line in Takings Jurisprudence, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv 433, 
504-{)5 (1995). The critical realist also attempts to locate-and install-her 
legal theoretic preoccupations in actual and proposed law. Pre-occupied with 
the analytic problem of unseen situational influence and manipulation, the 
critical realist addresses these inquiries to the legal conception of "misleading" 
speech, and calls misleading those unseen influences, particularly where they 
operate to people's obvious detriment. 
150. For other innovative approaches to regulating junk-food advertising, see 
Val ere Byrd Fulwider, Future Benefits? Tax Policy, Advertising, and the 
Epidemic of Obesity in Children, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 217  
(2003) (proposing changes to the tax treatment of advertising campaigns 
dire,cted at children); see also Mona L. Hymel, Consumerism, Advertising, and 
the Role of Tax Policy, 20. VA. TAX REV. 348 (2000) (analyzing the influence 
of tax policy on advertising practices and proposing reforms). 
HeinOnline -- 39 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 539 2006
May 2006] RESISTING DEEP CAPTURE 539 
discussed infra, that is, . in any event, how the Supreme Court would 
likely approach its review of such a ban. l SI 
A near total ban is necessary, I assert, because the case-by-case 
adjudication of false or . misleading advertising in which the FTC, 
state agencies, and common law courts are presently involved, is 
hopelessly inadequate to the enormity of the problem. The case-by­
case method, ins,titutionally, can never keep track of every adver­
tisement that is potentially misleading to consumers. Neither can 
consumers themselves keep track of, and bring complaint against, the 
avalanche of misleading junk-food advertising they confront on 
television, radio, billboards, print periodicals, the Internet, or as 
product placements within entertainment programming, music, video 
games, and even live theater. IS2 
Nor would it suffice to ban in piecemeal fashion specific types 
or methods of advertising, such as the use of cartoon characters in 
the selling of jUnk food. Such limitations would no doubt be 
helpful-and my argument for the constitutionality of a near total 
ban could certainly be applied to resolve constitutional appre­
hensions about such regulation. l s3 But the problem with such an 
1 5 1 .  In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 565 (200 1), for 
example, the Court found that limitations on billboard advertising of tobacco 
products "to children" impinged substantially on the advertising of such 
products to adults, and thus analyzed the ban in terms of its impact on the First 
Amendment interests of adults. See infra text accompanying notes 232-239 
discussing this aspect of Lorillard). Certainly there are ways of conceiving of 
a narrow ban that might not substantially infringe on the promotion of junk 
food to adults, such as banning junk-food advertising in television 
programming which h� an audience comprised overwhelmingly, or 
substantially, of children-while allowing junk-food advertising in all other 
television programming. Such a ban would perhaps be shown greater 
deference as far as constitutional standards are concerned, see infra text 
accompanying notes 234-236, but programmatically, in light of the ubiquity of 
junk-food advertising in our society in so many places frequented by both 
children and adults, such a ban would undoubtedly be far less effective than 
the near total ban that I propose and analyze here. 
1 52. See Joe Mandese, Paid Product Placement Surges in Magazines, 
Newspapers, Other . Media, MEDIA DAILY NEWS, July 26, 2005, 
http ://publications.mediapost.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=Articles.showArticle 
HomePage&art_aid=32440. 
1 53. See infra Part III. But see Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and 
the First Amendment, 8 1  IOWA L. REv. 589, 627-28 ( 1996) (arguing that a ban 
on the use of cartoon characters such as "Joe Camel" in tobacco advertising 
would be incompatible with the First Amendment). 
HeinOnline -- 39 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 540 2006
540 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA W REVIEW [Vol. 39:507 
approach is that marketing departments of profit-driven corporations 
will always stride several steps ahead of such piecemeal regulatory 
practice, as market forces compel the most capable corporations 
continually to discover mechanisms of misleading advertising that 
have yet to · be discerned by the government. · There are numerous 
ways for marketers to manipulate children's consumption behavior, 
and their thinking about their behavior, in unseen ways. Indeed, 
market forces will drive corporations to discover and exploit such 
methods even where corporate managers have not consciously 
endeavored to do so, as the discussion of puffery demonstrated. 154 
Finally, a federal, legislative ban on junk-food advertising 
obviates ·  the need to tangle with thorny common law issues such as 
"proximate cause," which would have to be satisfied were a remedy 
to this problem sought through innovative causes of action styled in 
tort. It is not suggested or proved here that junk-food advertising is 
the sole "cause" of childhood obesity-but no such proof is needed 
to justify the regulation of junk-food advertising, the perniciouis 
effect of which is clear. 155 
Thus, I propose a near total ban on junk-food advertising, which 
I call the "tombstone blues. ,, 1 56 The basic features of this proposal 
are discussed in greater detail in Part III.B.3, following · an 
explanation of the constitutional standard that any such ban must 
satisfy. In short, I envision a regulatory regime in which junk-food 
1 54. See supra Part II.C.2 . . 
155. Piecemeal litigation incorporating the insights described here, and 
elsewhere, may nevertheless be possible, but the development . of such an 
approach is already being forestalled by legislative efforts at the state and 
federal levels to insulate food companies from lawsuits in connection with the 
obesity epidemic. See Broken Scales, supra note 3, at 1772-74 (discussing 
federal legislative proposals to put an end to obesity-related lawsuits against 
fast food companief" including the Commonsense Consumption Act and the 
Personal ResponsiOility . in Food Consumption Act); see also Forrest Lee 
Andrews, Small Bites: . Obesity Lawsuits Prepare to Take on the Fast Food 
Industry, 1 5  ALB. LJ. SCI. & TECH. 1 53 (2004) (reviewing the limited progress 
of obesity related lawsuits). 
1 56. I use the term "tombstone" in order to connect my proposal to the 
"tombstone" advertising regime employed in the federal regulation of 
securities advertising, and because the term itself is evocative of the dire stakes 
at issue here. See infra Part III.B.3. The "blues" connection is merely slang 
shorthand for the . ban proposed by the Article. The usage here is inspired by 
JACK �ROUAC, MEXICO CITY BLUES (1 959) and BOB DYLAN, Tombstone 
Blues, on HrGHW A Y 61  REVISITED (Columbia Records 1965). 
! 
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I 
advertising is limited to what is referred to under the federal 
securities advertising regulatory regime as- "tombstone" formatting: 
plain letters, perhaps a simple picture, against a plain background, 
describing a limited, prescribed set of information regarding the 
advertised junk-food item. ls7 
My proposal is not entirely - fanciful, nor is the analysis 
supporting it merely - an academic exercise. I S S  As discussed earlier, 
the FtC pro�osed banning all television advertising to children -in the 
late-1 970s. I 9 Despite the fact that the FTC does not appear to have 
the appetite for it, Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) proposed 
legislation in June 2004 that would broadly empower the FTC to 
restrict advertising of food and beverages to children, and which 
would ban junk-food advertising to children in schools altogether. 160 
Further, other nations suffering their own childhood obesity 
crises have begun to respond, in part, by restricting junk-food 
advertising. Sweden, for example, has implemented a near total ban 
on any advertising directed at children under the age of twelve. 161 
Similarly, Canadian law purports to prohibit all advertising directed 
at children under thirteen. 162 Other countries have less complete, but 
I 
still significant, bans: Belgium bans all advertising during children's 
television programming, and Australia bans advertisements during 
1 57. As I discuss further infra Part III.B.3, the tombstone blues proposal is 
not only modeled on the near total ban on securities advertising prescribed by 
federal regulations,_ it is advanced for similar reasons-in particular, the 
vulnerability of the' consumer vis-A-vis the enormous power of the seller to 
mislead with respect to the offered item. 
1 58. While it is not merely an academic exercise, it is, indeed, an academic 
exercise--One that I hope may prove useful to other projects evaluating the 
wisdom and plausibility of commercial speech regulation, irrespective of the 
programmatic conclusions drawn here. 
1 59, See supra Part II.C.l .  
160. Harkin's bill would, inter alia, allow: 
the Federal Trade Commission to issue regulations that restrict the 
marketing or advertising of foods and beverages to children under the 
age of 1 8  years if the [FTC] determines that there is evidence that 
consumption of certain foods and beverages is detrimental to the 
health of children or it determines advertising to children to be unfair 
or deceptive. 
S. 2558, 108th Congo § 302 (as introduced to the Senate, June 22, 2004). 
1 6 1 .  Story & French, supra note 74, at 13-14. 
162. See Karla K. Gower, Looking Northward: Canada 's Approach 
to Commercial Expression, 10 COMM. L. & POL'y 29, 50 (2005); see, e.g. , 
Consumer Protectioh Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40. 1 ,  §§ 248, 249 (2005). 
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television programming directed at preschoolers. 163 While the 
constitutional analysis · advanced in this Article does not directly join 
a discussion of the legal standing of these bans in foreign countries, 
their existence at least suggests that such an approach is not wholly 
inconsistent with democratic practices and values. 
The next pah of this Article argues that, in the proper form, a 
junk-food advertising ban is both wise and constitutionally viable. It 
is hoped that this exegesis may contribute generally to a freshened 
understanding of the commercial speech doctrine, even if my 
application of the analysis to a proposed junk food advertising ban is 
unsatisfying to the reader. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERMISSIBILITY OF 
BANNING JUNK-FOOD ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN 
A. Dispositionism and the Modern Commercial Speech Doctrine 
I began my case for a junk-food advertising ban by citing to 
Justice Thomas's facetiously intended argument in Lorillard, a case 
in which the Court struck down on First Amendment grounds 
Massachusetts's attempt to regulate tobacco product advertising on 
billboards directed at children.l64 The holding in Lorillard should 
give pause to anyone wh,o is sanguine about government's power to 
regulate junk-food advertising to children. Nevertheless, in what 
follows I argue f that it need only give pause, and that neither 
L(Jrillard, nor other recent cases commonly seen as indicating that 
the Court is trending towards higher levels of scrutiny for 
commercial speech regulations, 1 65 preclude a junk-food advertising 
ban such as my tombstone blues proposal. 
163. Story & French, supra note 74, at 14. 
164. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 587-88 (2001 ). 
Although, the Court also held that several of the Massachusetts regulations at 
issue were preempted by federal law regulating tobacco products, the Court did 
not hesitate to reach and decide the First Amendment issues presented. Id. at 
54 1 .  The Massachusetts regulations pertained also to cigar and smokeless 
tobacco advertising, neither of which is regulated by the federal government. 
[d. at 533. 
165. See infra Part III.A. I .  
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1 .  Basic Overview of the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
The commercial speech doctrine is of relatively recent 
constitutional vintage. Until the 1 970s, the Court considered 
commercial speech to be merely an aspect of economic activity, and 
therefore held that such speech could be regulated to the same extent 
as the underlying commercial practice. 166 In the 1 970s, this view 
came under scrutiny by legal scholars. In a seminal article, Professor 
Martin Redish identified several problems with the Court's view that 
purely commercial speech enjoyed no First Amendment 
protection. 167 Most importantly, Redish recognized that much 
commercial speech serves First Amendment values by proliferating 
information of political, social, economic, and personal importance, 
just as do other forms of speech that have traditionally been granted 
constitutional protection for the purpose of serving that function. 168 
Redish argued that Commercial speech should be afforded 
constitutional protection because listeners have an interest in the 
content of such speech. 169 
In 1976, the Court turned away from its commercial speech 
precedent and adopted the basic view set out by Redish. In Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc. , 1 70 the Court invalidated a Virginia statute that · prohibited 
pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription drugs. 1 7l  The 
Court announced that a commercial advertisement is constitutionally 
protected because it furthers the societal interest in the free flow of 
166. See, e.g. , Valentine v. Chrestensen, 3 16 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that 
''the Con�titution imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely 
commercial advertising," and rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a New 
York City ordinance forbidding commercial pamphleting on city streets). In 
truth, the Valentine court engaged in little analysis as to whether "purely 
commercial" speech is protected, but merely presumed that it was not. See 
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 5 13-14 (1959) (Douglas, J., who 
had taken part in ' Valentine, concUrring) ("[Valentine] held that business 
advertisements and commercial matters did not enjoy the protection of the First 
Amendment . . . .  The ruling was casual, almost offhand. And it has not 
survived reflection."). 
1 67. See Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: 
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 429 (1971). 
168. Id. at 432-34. 
169. See id. 
170. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
17 1 .  Id. at 769. ' 
. 
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commercial information. 1 72 
Redish had argued in support of commercial speech protection 
by highlighting the Court's analysis in New York Times v. Sullivan, 1 73 
in which the· Court sanctified the principle that a central purpose of 
the First Amendment is to lend support to the production and 
dissemination of information crucial to the healthy functioning of a 
democratic society. 174 To that end, the Sullivan Court famously held 
that no liabilitY could attach to a newspaper for negligent7s" 
publishing defamatory statements about a public official. 1 5 
Permitting liability to attach for negligently false statements would 
threaten to chill the dissemination of truthful, valuable speech. 1 76 
The Court insisted on providing wide latitude for experimentation 
and mistake in the context of political speech. l77 In fashioning the 
modem commercial speech doctrine, however, the Court departed 
from this crucial feature of Sullivan. The problem of over­
deterrence, the Court concluded, has far less purchase in connection 
with purely commercial speech than it does with regard to political 
speech. 178 The ! Court explained this most clearly in its second 
cornerstone modem commercial speech case, Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona: 179 
Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading of course 
is subject to restraint. Since the advertiser knows his 
. product and has a commercial interest in its dissemination, 
we have little worry that regulation to assure truthfulness 
will discourage protected speech. And any concern that 
strict requirements for truthfulness will undesirably inhibit 
spontaneity seems inapplicable because commercial speech 
generally is calculated. Indeed, the. public and private 
172. Id. at 765 ("To this end, the free flow of commercial information is 
indispensable."). . 
173 .  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
174. Id. at 266; see Redish, supra note 167, at 435-36. 
175. Redish, supra note 1 67, at 436. 
1 76. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 300--01 .  
1 77 . The Court further reasoned that there is no concern with over-deterring 
knowingly or recklessly false speech about a political figure, and so such 
valueless speech could be prohibited directly without inhibiting the wide 
latitude that must be provided to ensure the free flow of useful speech. Id. at 
291 .  
178. See id. 
179. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
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benefits from commercial speech derive from confidence in 
its accuracy and reliability. Thus, the leeway for untruthful 
or misleading expression that has been allowed in other 
contexts has little force in the commercial arena. ISO 
545 
Other justifications have been offered for allowing firmer 
government regulation of false and misleading speech in commercial 
than in non-commercial contexts, but the reasons specified here are 
the .most enduring and important: commercial speakers have great 
knowledge of the truth or falsity of their speech, so it is easy for 
them to limit themselves to truthful speaking, and the profit-motive 
impelling commercial speech makes certain that such speech will be 
undeterred by aggressive regulation. l S I  Though only the last 
1 80. Id. at 383-84 (internal citations omitted). Bates, of course, concerned 
advertising by a lawyer. First Amendment scholars have sometimes treated the 
Court's many lawyer advertising cases as a kind of distinct eddy swirling off to 
the side of mainstream commercial speech analysis. See Alex Kozinki & 
Stuart Banner, Who 's Afraid o/Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627, 630 
(1 990) ("At present, the law of attorney advertising has grown to such an 
extent that it has been able to seal itself off from its roots in first amendment 
theory."); see also Smolla, supra note 1 24, at 1290 n.41 ("Lawyer advertising 
at times appears to be regarded as a 'second class' commercial speech citizen, 
not entitled to full participation in the free speech privileges and immunities 
other advertisers enjoy."). In my view, the lawyer advertising cases play a 
pivotal part in the architecture of the modem commercial speech doctrine. The 
Court itself, as is evidenced in the quote in the text that attends this footnote, 
has never treated such cases as fundamentally different from other commercial 
speech cases, and rhutinely relies on lawyer advertising cases in non-lawyer 
commercial speech cases. See, e.g. , Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 
525, 528 (200 1) (citing Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 5 1 5  U.S. 6 18  ( 1995» ; 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 5 1 7  U.S. 484, 498 (1 996) (citing Bates) . 
. 1 8 1 .  The Court has identified several other justifications for affording less 
constitutional protection to commercial speech. One justification is the speech 
is of lesser value than political speech. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. 
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 8 1  (1 983) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The commercial 
aspect of a message may provide it justification for regulation that is not 
present when the communication has no commercial character."). Another 
justification is that the need to regulate commercial speech would necessarily 
level the protections afforded political speech if both forms of speech were 
reviewed under the same standard. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
Pub. Servo Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 579 (1 980) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) ("[I]t is important that the commercial speech concept not be 
defined too broadly lest speech deserving of greater constitutional protection 
be inadvertently suppressed."). Yet another justification is that because 
government enjoys the greater power to restrict or forbid a particular kind of 
commercial enterprise, it must enjoy the lesser power to regulate the 
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justification may: survive scrutiny, it is enough to sustain effective 
. . 
government regulation of commercial speech, at least with respect to 
jurllc-food advertising to children, in light of the enormity of 
contemporary corporate power. 1 82 
Although he was certain that commercial speech shol.lld be 
afforded some constitutional protection, Redish was himself initially 
agnostic as to exactly what level of scrutiny should attach to 
commercial speech regulation. 1 83 After establishing the basic 
principles of its modern commercial speech doctrine in Virginia 
Pharmacy and Bates, the. Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New Yorkl84 formalized its 
approach to commercial speech cases, laying out a four-part test that 
establishes an "intermediate" level of review: 
[ 1 ]  At the outset, we must determine whether the expression 
is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial 
speech to come within that provision, it at least must 
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. [2] Next, we 
ask whether the asserted governmental interest is 
substantial. [3] If both inquiries yield positive answers, we 
must determ�ne whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and [4] whether it is not 
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 1 8S 
This test has guided the Court's approach to every commercial 
advertising of such enterprises. See, e.g. , Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 
521 U.S. 457, 475-76 (1997) ("While the First Amendment unquestionably 
protects the individual producer's right to advertise its own brands . . .  
[a]ppropriate respect for the power of Congress . . .  provides abundant support 
for the constitutionality of these marketing orders. "). 
1 82. "Power economics," which predicts that market forces will compel 
corporations to discover and exploit situational influence over consumers even 
where there is no cQnscious intention to do so on the part of corporate officers, 
may cut against the "greater access to the truth of the speech" justification 
advanced in support of lesser protections for commercial than for non­
commercial speech. See supra text accompanying note 57. On the enormity of 
corporate. power in contemporary American society, see Hanson & Yosifon, 
The Situation, supra note 21 ,  at 193-:203. 
1 83. See Redish, supra note 167, at 447. 
1 84. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
1 85. Id. at 565. The Court describes the Central Hudson test as being very 
similar to the test it uses to analyze "time, place, and manner" restrictions on 
constitutionally protected speech. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 
U.S. 525, 573 (200 1). 
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speech case since Central Hudson. In recent years, however, 
commentators and several justices have urged the Court to drop 
Central Hudson in favor of the "strict scrutiny" that it traditionally 
applies to government regulations aimed at non-commercial 
speech: 86 Indeed, even as the Court has fonnally maintained 
allegiance to Central Hudson, some commentators argue that the 
Court's practice in commercial speech cases in fact evinces a trend 
towards stricter levels of scrutiny, 1 87 a trend which may portend a 
coming end to Central Hudson, but which in any event is crafting a 
commercial speech jurisprudence which increasingly restrains 
government efforts to regulate commercial speech. 18S 
Professor Redish himself today contends that there is no 
principled justification for denying commercial speech the same 
level of First Amendment protection as is afforded non-commercial 
speech. 189 He shares the view of other First Amendment scholars 
who see in the maintenance of a special category of "commercial 
speech" a genuine threat to core free speech interests. 190 Redish 
warns that any argument licensing greater government regulation of 
commercial speech can, by logical extension, be deployed against 
social and political speech as well; such arguments must therefore be 
avoided, Redish insists, if First Amendment interests are to be 
served. 191 For example, the argument that the robustness of the 
1 86. See, e.g. , Smolla, supra note 124, at 1 292; Kozinki & Banner, supra 
note 1 80; see also Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring); 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 5 17  U.S. 484, 5 1 8  (1996). 
1 87. See, e.g. , Smolla, supra note 124, at 1292 ("[E]xamination of the actual 
case decisions demonstrates that the trajectory of modem commercial speech 
law has been an accelerating rise of protection for advertising."). 
1 88. Id. . 
1 89. Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the 
Commercial Speech Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. 
Ky. L. REv. 553, 565 (1997) ("[C]areful examination reveals that without 
question, none of the remaining arguments relied upon to justify commercial 
speech's second class status justifies the distinction's continued existence."). 
1 90. See Kozinki & Banner, supra note 1 80, at 630; see also Rodney A. 
Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive 
Protection of Commercial Speech, 71  TEx. L. REv. 777 (1 992-1993); cf Alex 
Kozinksi and Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial 
Speech, 7 1  Tex. L. Rev. 747 (1993) (providing a brilliant historical analysis of 
the commercial speech doctrine). 
19 1 .  See Redish, supra note 1 89 (arguing that justifications for regulating 
commercial speech threaten non-commercial speech freedoms). Below, I 
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profit motive behind corrimercial speech can justify the government 
prohibiting false and misleading speech altogether in the commercial 
speech context without · fear of over-deterring the production of 
valuable speech, cannot be . limited so as to apply only to commercial 
speech. 192 After all, Redish argues, much non-commercial speech is 
backed by very �trong motives, such as a strong commitment to a 
moral or political vision. 193 Redish has also · extended his original 
argument to contend that commercial speech is j ust as important to 
people, £erhaps even more important, as is social and political 
speech. 1 4 Thus, the importance of commercial speech counsels in 
favor of affording it at least as much First Amendment p.rotection as 
is thought to be appropriate for non-commercial speech. 95 The only 
coherent and normatively justifiable thing to do, Redish concludes, is 
to treat commercial and non-commercial speech the same for First 
Amendment purposes. 196 
I think that such a position is extremist and implausible. It 
would have outrageous consequences if it were truly embraced. For 
example, it must follow from Redish's view that business 
corporations could not be held liable for merely negligent product 
advertising. For instance, junk-food advertising that was merely 
negligent in its failure to accurately to convey, say, a food's fat 
content, could not be prohibited. Since there is no way to distinguish 
commercial from non-commercial speech, and because commercial 
speech is possibly more valuable than political speech, the concerns 
that animated Sullivan must necessarily apply to commercial speech 
as well. Thus, no claim based in negligent speech could stand 
without unduly chilling commercial speech under this view. Such a 
result would obviously work an extremely radical alteration to 
contemporary b.usiness regulation. 197 
analyze the regulation of corporate political speech in the context of "deep 
capture" advertising� See infra Part IV. 
192. See Redish, supra note 1 89, at 578. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 579. 
195. Id. at 564-65. 
196. See id. at 583-84. 
· 197. Redish's insistence that arguments advanced to justify latitude for 
commercial speech always threaten core political speech if accepted, is also 
extreme and unavailing. Many kinds of speech are regulated for reasons that 
could justify core political speech suppression if taken at a sufficient level of 
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Redish does not recognize, let alone justify, such destructive 
implications in his commercial speech theory. The oversight reflects 
a general failure on the part of proponents of strict scrutiny 
protection for commercial speech to appreciate the depth of the 
problem posed by misleading and manipulative commercial speech. 
Commercial speech serves First Amendment interests when it flows 
both "freely and c1eanly. ,, 198 The insufficient attention to the 
problem of ensuring the clean flow of commercial speech stems from 
a too stylized and abstract conception of human information 
processing, a dispositionist conception which tends not to see the 
manipulative power of commercial speech, and where it does see it, 
expresses an unwarranted confidence that the problem of misleading 
or manipulative speech can always be solved with more speech. 199 
abstraction. Consider, for example, restrictions on comments to the press 
by a lawyer about an ongoing trial in which she is involvent. The abstract 
justifications for such a restriction-protecting the legal system's interest in 
the sanctity of the trial process�ould also be applied to limit press coverage 
of ongoing trials. But abstract reckonings did not render the contours of the 
First Amendment; experience draws the lines that limit the applicability of 
given justifications. Thus, while lawyers may not speak freely, the press may. 
Redish's assertion that the "robustness" justification cannot be contained to 
commercial speech has certain appeal as an analytic proposition, but upon 
inspection there remain "common sense" distinctions between commercial and 
non-commercial speech, which make the robustness justification more 
reasonable when applied to commercial speech. See Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, 47 1 U.S. 626, 637 (1 985) ("Our commercial speech 
doctrine rests heavily on 'the "common-sense" distinction between speech 
proposing a commercial transaction . . . and other varieties of speech,' and 
appellant's adveqisements undeniably propose a commercial transaction." 
(citation omitted)). Commercial speech is concerned with proposing a 
commercial transaction, the truth about which the commercial speaker has, or 
should have, particular knowledge (respecting the attributes of the product, the 
price at which it is offered, etc;). The profit motive drives the communication 
of this particular ' knowledge. These two factors, profit motive and 
particularized knowledge, working in tandem, create the robustness 
justification, and the absence of this tandem in other categories of speech, such 
as social and political speech, limits its application to the commercial speech 
context. In any event, to the extent that the robustness of speech provides a 
compelling reason for greater regulatory latitude in other areas, that greater 
regulatory latitude should be considered in those areas as well. See, for 
example, my discussion of "drown out" and "overwhelmance" justifications 
for limiting corporate social and political speech, infra text accompanying 
notes 383':'-399. 
. 
198. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). 
199. In his seminal article on cominercial speech and the First Amendment, 
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Under this view, there is no need, much less justification, for 
restricting commercial speech.2oo If it is accepted, as critical realism 
urges, that intuition un-criticized yields a false conception of human 
agency, one that does not clearly appreciate human vulnerability to 
manipulation by commercial speech, then the problem of 
manipulative speech must become a central concern in commercial 
Redish admitted that "much of advertising is directed not to appeal to the 
individual's intellectual, rational capacities, but rather to a consumer's 
subconscious, irrational desires or self-image." Redish, supra note 1 67, at 446. 
But Redish was nonplused: 
[T]he first amendment's basis is primarily normative rather than 
factual. Although the first amendment assumes that man has a will 
and an intellect, its concern is that he should use them; it does not tum 
on whether he does use them. The less he does use them, the greater 
is the need to encourage their use. The more non-rational appeals that 
are made, the more important it is to protect appeals with a rational 
basis. 
Id. I discuss the inadequacy of the "more speech" retort to the problem posed 
by misleading speech in Part IV. 
200. For example, in his seminal writings on tobacco advertising, Professor 
Redish glosses over the widely expressed concern that tobacco advertising has 
powerfully mislead consumers in a manner that grossly misconstrues that 
concern. "Some argue," he writes, ''that regardless of its content, tobacco 
advertising is inherently misleading in suggesting or implying that use of such 
a harmful product can ever be a positive or beneficial experience." Redish, 
supra note 1 53, at 598. This parlor version of the debate about tobacco 
advertising makes no attempt to engage the extensive social scientific and legal 
theoretic study of the power tobacco advertising to mislead consumers about 
the health risks associated with smoking. See, e.g. , Jon Hanson & Kyle Logue, 
The Costs oj Cigarettes, 1 1 1  YALE L.J. 1 163 (2002); Jon Hanson & Douglas 
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market 
Manipulation, 1 12 HARV. L. REv. 1420 (1999) (reviewing decades of social 
scientific study of the manipulative power of cigarette advertising). Elsewhere, 
Redish treats the problem of the misleading power of advertising as a matter of 
logical indeterminacy. For instance, Redish writes in his discussion of adver­
tising campaigns that employ messages of health and vitality in connection 
with " smoking: "The fact that an activity is portrayed in advertising as 
pleasurable does not necessarily imply that the activity is also healthful." 
Redish, supra note 1 53,  at 609. Of course it does not necessarily imply that, 
but the fact that such a conclusion is not necessary is hardly conclusive as to 
whether or not it does yield a misleading implication. For Redish, the question 
of what advertising does is indeterminate, and because of the First 
Amendment'S presttmption in favor of speech, the tie of -the analytiC 
uncertainty goes to - speech. But," this need not be a matter of analytic un­
certainty. It can become, and is treated here; as a question of critical inquiry 
and distinction. " 
" 
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speech theory. A commercial speech theory focused only on the 
"free" and not the "clean" flow of commercial information serves the 
profit-making interests of commercial speakers, but not the listener 
interests that granting First Amendment status to commercial speech 
was meant to protect. 
In what follows, I analyze the modem commercial speech 
doctrine, and its supposed recent tightening, from a critical realist 
perspective. I hope to demonstrate that the doctrine is capable, 
analytically and normatively, of accommodating a ban on junk-food 
advertising such as the "Tombstone Blues." 
2. Downward Sloping Demand Curves and the Centrality of the 
Dispositional Actor in the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
The core theory of the modem commercial speech doctrine 
conforms to a highly dispositionist conception of human agency. 
People are construed as receiving and rationally analyzing advertised 
information in order to exercise consumer choices that satisfy their 
preferences and make them better off.2°1 In this section, I will argue 
that the Court always forbids the regulation of commercial speech 
where the avowed or implicit purpose of the regulation is the 
suppression of dispositional choice. In Central Hudson, the Court 
purported to express a balancing test, but from the earliest 
commercial speech cases, the Court has consistently refused to find 
that the suppresston of dispositional choice through the prohibition 
of truthful, non-r;nisleading information could be countenanced by 
the First Amendment.202 
This analysis explains an important adjudicative line in the 
commercial speech cases, spanning from the earliest annunciation of 
the modem commercial speech doctrine through the most recent 
cases. It does not, however, explain all of the cases, or all that the 
Court has had to say in formulating its jurisprudence in this area. 
There is also imminent in the commercial speech doctrine, I will 
argue, a concepti,on of the situational character. Where the Court 
20l .  See supra Part III.A. l (summarizing fundamental presumptions of the 
rational actor and other dispositionist models of human agency). 
202. Readers familiar with the commercial speech cases may immediately 
conjure Posadas de . Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto 
Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986), as a contrary example. I address Posadas, 
infra Part III.B.2. (reconciling Posadas and 44 Liquormart). 
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appreciates, or is made to appreciate, the powerful, situational 
influence of advertising, the Court expresses a willingness to 
countenance commercial speech regulation. It is this latter aspect of 
the commercial speech doctrine that the tombstone blues develops 
and exploits. A crucial step in that endeavor, however, is to examine 
and explain the central part played by the conception of the 
dispositional actor that, to be sure, now resides at the core of the 
commercial speech doctrine. 
The dispositional actor is present in its most essential form at the 
forging of the commercial speech doctrine in Virginia Pharmacy.203 
That formative case involved, recall, the state of Virginia's total 
prohibition on pliarmacist advertising of prescription drug prices?04 
Now, among the most hallowed scriptures of the dispositional!· 
rational actor schema of consumer agency, is consumer response to 
price . .  205 It is here that the Court has at its disposal the near 
talismanic power of the "downward sloping demand curve. "  
The "downward sloping demand curve" refers to a basic 
principle of economics which holds that because individuals 
independently value commercial goods at a given price, demand for 
a product will inprease when the price of a product drops (because 
more people will value it at a price greater than it is being sold at, 
and will therefore be more likely to purchase it). In The Situational 
Character, Professor Hanson and I argued that this basic framework 
reflects, and is supported by, common sense dispositionism?06 The 
downward sloping demand curve trope reflects the strongly held 
dispositionist intuition that consumers hold privatello ordered 
preferences that they bring to a given behavioral situation. 07 It is the 
intuitive plausibility of this simple dispositionist supply·and·demand 
story that makes the basic rational actor model so easily digestible by 
conventional legal analysis, and, it turns out, by the commercial 
speech doctrine.2?8 The parable of the downward sloping demand 
203 . Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748 ( 1976). 
204. See id. 
205. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 21 ,  at 145-57. 
206. See Hanson & Y osifon, The Situational Character, supra note 21 ,  at 
170-80. 
207. See id. at 1 39-4 1 .  
208. The fact that. demand curves do, in fact, slope downward-that is, that 
demand does increalie as price decreases, and decreases as price increases-is 
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curve is ripe for incantation wherever price communication is 
concerned. Where the communication of price information is 
prohibited, the Court sees starkly the suppression of dispositional 
choice, which it is the very purpose of the First Amendment to 
enable and facilitate. Where the government avowedly seeks to limit 
speech in order to interrupt that First Amendment task, as it did in 
Virginia Pharmacy, the Court will call it a constitutional violation?09 
Indeed, most of the leading cases striking down advertising 
regulations involve, at their core, the prohibition of price 
advertising?10 In each such case, the Court finds it impossible to see 
how price advertising could be false or misleading, and impossible to 
see how the proscription of such advertising could serve any 
legitimate government interest. In Virginia Pharmacy, the state 
argued that price advertising would result in price competition, 
which would drive consumers to cheaper pharmacists with perhaps 
lower standards of quality, thereby simultaneously harming the 
professionalism of pharmacists and leaving consumers worse Off.2 1 1  
The Court replied by invoking what has become an important axiom 
of its commercial speech jurisprudence: 
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic 
approach. That alternative is to assume that . . .  people will 
often advanced as support for the view that consumers do behave rationally 
and that the "rational actor" model represents a plausible modeling of human 
behavior for use in economic and legal analysis. Jack Hirshleifer, The 
Expanding Domain of Economics, 75 AM. ECON . .  REv. 53, 53 (1985). 
Important, un-rebutted arguments have also been made; however, the fact that 
demand curves are downward sloping does not provide evidence that 
consumers behave rationally. Nobel Prize winning economist Gary Becker 
demonstrated that demand curVes would slope in a downward fashion even if 
consumers made consumption decisions randomly, rather than rationally, 
because nearly every consumer has a limited amount of money to spend. See 
id. at 1 53-70. I do not pursue this debate here, as I am centrally concerned 
with analyzing the effect of the intuitive plausibility of what I am calling 
the downward-sloping demand curve trope on the Court's commercial 
speech jurisprudence. 
209. See, e.g. , Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773. 
2 10. Either by the regulation singling out price advertising in particular, or 
by the regulation banning all advertising relating to a legal product, including 
price advertising. S(!e, e.g. , 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 5 1 7  U.S. 484 
(1 996); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz. , 433 U.S. 350 (1977);. Virginia State Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748. 
21 1 .  Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 766--68. 
HeinOnline -- 39 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 554 2006
554 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3 9:507 
perceive their own best interests if only they are well 
enough informed . . . .  It is precisely this kind of choice, 
between the dangers of suppressing information, and the 
dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First 
Amendment ,makes for US?12 
Precisely wh�t the Court means is that the state may not advance 
a paternalistic approach through speech regulation, even though it 
repeatedly recognizes · in commercial speech cases that government 
could directly prohibit or limit many of the activities that it often 
impermissibly seeks to suppress through speech regulation?13 
This same vision of dispositional decision-making guides the 
Court's analysis · in Bates, where the Court invalidated on First 
Amendment grounds an Arizona law forbidding lawyers from 
advertising.214 The prohibition against lawyer advertising had deep 
roots in the American legal profession; challenging this practice 
would have been inconceivable before the revolution then underway 
in the Court's commercial speech doctrine.2lS Once again in Bates, 
the Court's analysis focused on the government's ban on price 
advertising.216 The Court could not see the furtherance of any 
permissible purpose in such a prohibition: "[W]e view as dubious 
any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.,,217 
What is missing in price advertising bans, such as were presented in 
Virginia Pharmacy and Bates, is any occasion for the Court to 
212. · [d. at 770. 
2 13 .  Seeking to influence consumer behavior, such as suppressing 
consumption of a particular · good, is a permissible legislative purpose. 
Forbidding prostitution or the recreational use of certain drugs are examples of 
legislative regimes widely perceived as paternalistic yet constitutionally 
permissible. See J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political 
and Constitutional Thought, 45. B.C. L. REv. 499, 539 n.1 44 (2004) ("[L]aws 
prohibiting gambling, drug use, prostitution, and abortion have both a moral 
and a paternalistic aspect."). 
. 
214. See Bates; 433 U.S. at 350. 
2 1 5. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW 
AND Ennes 799-809 (7th ed. 2005). 
2 1 6. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 350. 
2 1 7. [d. at 375 (emphasis added). The earnestness with which the Court 
strikes down advertising regulations thought to be advanced for the purpose of 
manipulating choice evinces, in my view, a faithful opposition to manipulation 
that may be exploited in the development of a more robust understanding of 
the manipulative . power of advertising than is presently evident in the 
commercial speech doctrine. 
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encounter the situational power of advertising, immersed as it is  in 
the quintessential explanation of dispositional behavior - price 
influence 
When we turn from these now classic commercial speech cases 
to the more recent cases, we see, in my view, merely an application 
of this core principle. · For example, in an important commercial 
speech case decided in 1 996, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,2 18 
the Court struck down on First Ammendment grounds a Rhode 
Island law prohibiting the advertising of liquor prices.219 Aside from 
pertaining to the sale of liquor rather than prescription drugs or legal 
services, the regulation at issue in 44 Liqourmart was very similar to 
the regulations struck down in Virginia Pharmacy and Bates.220 The 
Court's analysis of the ban in 44 Liqourmart was also broadly 
similar to that employed in those early cases, but coming after 
Central Hudson, the 44 Liquormart analysis was framed in terms of 
the Central Hudson test.221 
The Central Hudson test, recall, first requires the Court to 
determine whether the commercial sfeech at issue concerns a lawful 
activity and is "not misleading. ,,22 If those conditions are not 
satisfied, the sBeech does not come within First Amendment 
protection.223 I argue below that the commercial speech doctrine is 
unfortunately, but promisingly, underdeveloped with respect to the 
first step of the Central Hudson test.224 One of the chief reasons for 
this is that litigants seeking to defend commercial speech regulation, 
principally state attorneys general and state bar associations, have 
2 1 8. 5 1,7 U.S. 484 (1996). 
2 19. See id. 
220. The Court's most recent commercial speech case, Thompson v. Western 
States Medical Center, 535 U.s. 357 (2002), presented yet another echo of the 
basic ban at issue in Virginia Pharmacy. Thompson concerned a total ban on 
the advertising of "t;ompound" drugs that are exempted from the FDA's review 
process, yet legal to consume with a doctor's prescription. [d. The govern­
ment again waived any inquiry into the misleading power of the advertising, 
forcing the Court to conclude that the ban "amounts to a fear that people would 
make bad decisions if given truthful information about compounded drugs." 
[d. at 377. Because this fear could not be patronized through speech regulation 
without violating the First Amendment, the ban was overturned. [d. 
22 1 .  44 Liqourmart, 517 U.S. at 492. 
222. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 564-65 (1980). 
223. [d. . , 224. See infra text accompanying note 238. 
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repeatedly conceded the first step of the inquiry to the party 
challenging the regulation, making their defensive stand instead on 
the second, "balancing" part of the . test, which asks if the regulation 
advances a substantial government interest in a manner no more 
restrictive than necessary to accomplish that interest. For instance, 
the Rhode Island attorney general followed this pattern in 44 
Liquormart, conceding that the banned advertising was not 
misleading, and : arguing instead that the state had a substantial 
interest in promoting temperance, an interest that the advertising ban 
furthered in a sufficiently tailored fashion.225 
Approaching the case in such a posture, the Court refused to 
sustain the liquor-price advertising ban, holding once again that the 
First Amendment prohibits the restriction of dispositional choice 
through the prohibition of truthful, nonmisleading speech.226 Even 
though the government could otherwise limit the choice to purchase 
alcohol-such as by forbidding purchases on a Sunday-it could not 
do so by regulati�g truthful non-commercial speech without running 
afoul of the First Amendment.227 The government may not keep 
commercial information from consumers out of a fear that they will 
perceive the information correctly and act on it in a manner that the 
government believes inimical to consumers' interests.228 Justice 
Thomas, in his 44 Liquormart concurrence, urged the adoption of 
strict scrutiny for such cases, for reasons that I have argued already 
shape the Court's heartland commercial speech jurisprudence: 
[Where] the government's asserted interest is to keep legal 
users of a prqduct or service ignorant in order to manipulate 
their choices in . the marketplace, the balancing test . . .  
should not be applied, in my view. Rather, such an 'interest' 
is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of 
'commercial' speech than it can justify regulation of 'non­
commercial' speech.229 
The case perhaps most strongly thought to signal an expanding 
protection in the Court's . contemporary commercial speech 
225. 44 Liquormart, 5 1 7  U.S. at 504. 
226. · Id. at 496 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 42 1 U.S. 809 (1975» . 
227. Id. at 496-97. 
228. Id. at 497 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976» . 
229. Id. at 5 1 8  (citation omitted). 
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jurisprudence is Lorillard, introduced above, in which the Court 
overturned the state of Massachusetts's tobacco billboard advertising 
ban. In the principal opinion in Lorillard, Justice O'Connor 
recognized that Central Hudson seems to stand on precarious ground 
as "several Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the 
Central Hudson analysis and whether it should apply in particular 
cases., ,230 Nevertheless, O'Connor wrote, "we see no need to break 
new ground. Central Hudson, as applied in our more recent 
commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for 
decision.,,23 ! Indeed, the reason Central Hudson provided an 
"adequate basis for decision" is that in cases involving the admitted 
restriction of truthful nonmisleading information for the purpose of 
disabling dispositional choice, the Court's scrutiny has been 
forbidding. 
In Lorillard, the Court struck down the Massachusetts billboard 
advertising ban, despite the fact that the regulation purported only to 
regulate advertising directed at children, which the ban sought to 
accomplish by forbidding such advertising within 1 000 feet of 
schools.232 The Court accepted that the state has a substantial 
interest in reducing children's consumption of tobacco---that interest 
was indisEutable given that tobacco is illegal for children to consume.2 3 . The legitimacy of advancing this interest through a 
billboard advertising ban, however, had to be balanced aBainst the ban's incursion oq. the First Amendment interests of adults,2 4 for it is 
a bedrock First Amendment principle that "the government interest 
in protecting children from harmful materials . . . does not justify 
unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults. ,,235 
230. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (200 1). 
23 1 .  Id. at 554-55 (citations omitted). Justice Thomas, in his Lorillard 
concurrence, further developed his view that commercial speech should be 
afforded the same protections, and analyzed under the same strict scrutiny 
framework, as non-commercial speech. In Lorillard, Thomas wrote : "I share 
the Court's view that the regulations fail even the intermediate scrutiny of 
Central Hudson . . .  [but] I continue to believe that when the government seeks 
to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict 
scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in question may be 
characterized as 'commercial. '" Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
232. Id. at 566. 
233. See id. at 564. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 52 1 U.S. 844, 875 (1 997)). 
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In the Court's colorful phrasing, . " [t]he level of discourse reaching a 
mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for 
a sandbox. ,,2)6 . .  . 
In Lorillard, the government again irredeemably sandbagged its 
own case by its unwise waiver of the first part of the Central Hudson 
inquiry?37 The government did not need to show that the advertising 
was false or misleading to justify its suppression vis-a-vis children­
but to show that the speech was not unwarrantedly kept from adults, 
the question of whether it was false or misleading, or truthful and 
informative, becomes exceedingly important. With the state waiving 
this issue, the Cpurt was left to analyze the propriety of what it 
considered to be " [i]n some geographical areas . . .  nearly a complete · 
ban on the communication of truthful information about [tobacco 
products] to adult consumers. ,,238 As Justice Thomas noted in his 
236. Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 
(1983» . 
237; Id. at 555 ("The Attorney General has assumed for purposes of 
summary judgment that petitioners' speech is entitled to First Amendment 
protection."). � 
238. Id. at 562 . .  The Court's characterization of the effect of the ban is 
grossly overbroad, even ridiculous. Even with the Massachusetts ban in place, 
tobacco companies could still communicate truthful information about tobacco 
products to adults through print advertising or direct mailing. The regulations 
also permitted retailers to indicate through limited signage that they sold 
tobacco products. See id. at 536. The Court's treatment in Lorillard is terribly 
disappointing, even embarrassing, in its failure to engage at all the obvious 
"captive audience" problem presented by billboard advertising, a problem the 
Court had actually addressed in a fairly sophisticated fashion in a tobacco 
billboard advertising prohibition case seventy years before Lorillard. In 
Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 1 1 0 (1932), the Court upheld a Utah 
prohibition of tobacco advertising on billboards against constitutional 
challenge: . . 
. Advertisements
' of this sort are constantly before the eyes of observers 
on the streets and in street cars to be seen without the exercise of 
. choice or volition on their part. Other forms of advertising are 
ordinarily seen as a matter of choice on the part of the observer. The 
young people as well as the adults have the message of the billboard 
thrust upon them by all the arts and devices that skill can produce. In 
the case of newspapers and magazines, there must be some seeking by 
the one who is to see and read the advertisement. The radio can be 
turned off, but not so the billboard or street car placard. These 
distinctions clearly place this kind of advertisement in a position to be 
classified so that regulations or prohibitions may be imposed upon all 
within the class. This is impossible with respect to newspapers or 
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concurrence, n[t]hese concessions . . .  make this an easy case, one 
clearly controlled by 44 Liquormart.n239 Left with no other way of 
construing the advertising's influence on adult consumers" the waiver 
of the first part of the Central Hudson test leaves the balancing 
inquiry in Lorillard to be controlled by the deductively applicable 
principle that discourse to adults cannot be limited to what is 
appropriate for th;e sandbox. 
B. Beyond Downward-Sloping Demand Curves-The Situational 
Character and the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
The commercial speech doctrine thus reflects and entrenches a 
highly dispositionist conception of human agency. The core of the 
Court's jurisprudence in this area revolves around a stylized picture 
of a rational actor accumulating information, the better to make 
consumption decisions that are in her own best interest. 
Yet, one reason that dispositionist expression is so clearly 
evident in commercial speech jurisprudence is because it is the 
expression that �e, in our dispositionism, are primed to see. If this 
orientation can be restrained, a second strand of reasoning can be 
discerned in the commercial speech cases, one that evidences a latent 
recognition and willingness to accommodate the reality of the 
situational character. In the previous section, I argued that where the 
Court sees government constraining dispositional choice through 
speech prohibition, the Court inevitably strikes the regulation 
down.24o However, where the Court has occasion to recognize the 
I 
magazines. The legislature may recognize degrees of evil and adapt 
, its legislation accordingly. 
[d. The principle opinion in Lorillard cites Packer just once, for a proposition 
concerning the presumption of no federal preemption of areas of traditional 
state regulation, but without discussion or even mentioning that the case 
involved the regulation of billboard advertising of tobacco products . Lorillard, 
533 U.S. at 54 1 .  The failure to engage this troubling dimension of billboard 
advertising is another consequence of the lack of any critical inquiry into the 
effect of the advertising due to the state's waiver of the first part of the Central 
Hudson test. 
239. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 578. 
240. There is language in Central Hudson itself intimating that the Court 
would have countenanced a paternalistic purpose at the heart of a ban on 
advertising promoting energy consumption. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. 
v. Pub. Servo Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1 980) ("[I]t leaves open the 
possibility that the State may suppress advertising of electricity in order to 
lessen demand for electricity."). But the Court did overturn the ban at issue in 
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situational power of advertising to influence human thinking and 
behavior in unseen, potentially manipulative ways, the Court sustains 
the advertising regulation, or at · least indicates that it would be 
willing to do so if the case for the situational character were made.241 
This line of reasoning makes clear that the First Amendment does 
not sanctify any particular conception of human decision-making. 
The government need not embrace an intuitive conception of human 
agency - if it makes the case, it may regulate with reference to a 
more scientifically informed model of consumer behavior. The 
adoption, on the ' part of the government, of a situational character 
view of human agency, might produce acceptable, prudent 
commercial speech regulation that would be inconceivable, or 
conceived of as unwise, under a highly dispositionist framework. 
1 .  Seeing the Situational Character in the Commercial Speech Cases 
While this second strain ' in the commercial speech doctrine is 
evident even in Virginia Pharmacy,242 it is easier to grasp in Bates, 
which, together with Virginia Pharmacy, outlined the core principles 
of the Court's modem commercial speech doctrine prior to its formal 
expression in Central Hudson?43 As noted, once the two-part 
Central Hudson test was established, it separated for the purposes of 
analytic inquiry the question of whether speech was false or 
misleading on the one hand, and, if it was not, whether the 
challenged regul�tion nevertheless furthered a substantial govern­
ment interest in a sufficiently tailored fashion, on the other?44 
Litigants, perhaps looking wide-eyed at the intermediate balancing 
standard promised in the test's second part, have routinely skipped 
over the first part of the test, waiving the issue of whether the 
Central Hudson (on the grounds that it was overbroad) and has, in fact, never 
allowed an avowedly paternalistic purpose to. support commercial speech 
regulation. Id. at 565; see also Redish, supra note 1 53, at 6 13  ("At most, the 
Court's acceptance ' of the pro-paternalism model in Central HudsOn was 
dictum, and implied dictum, at that."). 
24 1 .  Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 348 
(1 986) (sustaining a ban on casino advertising to Puerto Rican residents). 
242. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 77 1 ( 1 976) ("[M]uch commercial speech is not provably false, 
or even wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle 
to a State's dealing effectively with this problem."). 
243. See supra text accompanying note 1 80. 
244. See supra text accompanying notes 1 84-1 85. 
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commercial speech at issue is "misleading. ,,245 In Bates, the analysis 
was not yet so bifurcated. Bates therefore provides an opportunity to 
glimpse the Court grappling directly with the "misleading" 
question.246 . . . . . 
At issue in Bates, beyond the price advertising prohibition, was, 
for example, the defendant lawyers' advertising describing their low­
fee services as a "legal clinic"-a usage which the state claimed was 
misleading to consumers, and could thus be proscribed without 
violation of the First Amendment.247 It is not exactly clear how the 
Court went about scrutinizing this assertion, but it appears that the 
Court just eyebal�ed it with a kind of rough situation-sense : 
On this record, these assertions [of the ways the term could 
be misleading] are unpersuasive. We suspect that the public 
would readily understand the term 'legal clinic'-if, indeed, 
it focused on the term at all-to refer to an operation like 
that of appellants' that is geared to provide standardized and 
multiple services.248 
The Court concludes that the term is not misleading; after all, 
"the clinical concept in the sister profession of medicine surely by 
now is publicly acknowledged and understood. ,,249 
245. See infra text accompanying notes 248-256, suggesting that another 
reason for this pattern is because government approaches commercial speech 
regulation with an underdeveloped conception of consumer · behavior and 
decision-making, and so focuses on the second pari of the test, which does not 
critically inquire about the sources of such behavior. 
246. See supra note 1 80, arguing that the lawyer advertising cases play a 
fundamental part in the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence. 
247. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 378-79 ( 1977). 
248. Id at 38 1 .  While the second part of the Central Hudson test is a classic 
formulation of "intermediate scrutiny," it is not at all clear what standard of 
review the Court applies to the first part of the test with respect to whether 
speech is "false" or "misleading" and therefore entitled to First Amendment 
protection at all. The lawyer advertising cases reveal an analytic approach 
which might be said to be a kind of constitutional version of what Karl 
Llewellyn called "situation sensing." See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, 
supra note 21 ,  at 293-98 (analyzing the latent dispositionism in Llewellyn's 
"situation sense" theory); cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, 
Content Neutrality, 'and the First Amendment Dog that Didn 't Bark, 1994 SUP. 
CT. REv. 1 ,  40-41 (urging the application of "contextualization" in 
constitutional analysis, but also observing that "[ c ]elebrations of situation 
sense and practical reason frequently dissolve into philosophical mush"). 
249. Bates, 433 U.S� at 382. On the other hand, people might more readily 
think that a "legal clinic" involved some kind of public-service workshop, 
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Justice Powell saw things differently and dissented.25o His 
departure from the majority stemmed simply from his differing 
naked-eye assessment of whether the advertising at issue was, in fact, 
misleading: "The! average lay person simply has no feeling for which 
services are included in the packaged divorce, and thus no capacity 
to judge the nature of the advertised product. As a result, the type of 
advertisement before us inescapably will mislead many who respond 
to it. ,,25 1 Powell looked at the price listings for so-called 
standardized legal services in the legal clinic's advertising-such as 
prices for uncontested divorces or wills-fmds they are misleading, 
and thus that they can be prohibited without Constitutional offense. 
Now, the question of whether people are misled by a for-profit 
law firm advertising itself as a "legal clinic" is an empirical one. In 
the context of advertising involving the legal profession, the Court 
betrays a particular confidence in its knowledge of what is or is not 
misleading to consumers-this is, after all, the one area of social life 
about which the Court may consider itself to have a peculiar 
knowledge. A fobtnote in Powell's dissent makes this clear: 
A high percentage of couples seeking counsel as to divorce 
desire initially that it be uncontested. They often describe 
themselves as civilized people who have mutually agreed to 
separate; they want a quiet, out-of-court divorce without 
alimony. But experienced counsel knows that the initial 
spirit of amity often fades quickly when the collateral 
problems are carefully explored.252 
Put differently, Powell appreciated that people may be misled 
because they think of themselves as rational actors who will bring 
stable preferences with them to the circumstance of obtaining a 
divorce. But Powell implicitly understood that people are in fact 
situational characters; that the situation of divorce-the legal 
proceedings, the coming acrimony, etc., will alter their preferences 
and behavior in ways they may not anticipate or appreciate. 
Reviewing the lawyer's divorce advertising against that reality, rather 
than against consumers' own intuitions about themselves, the 
advertising can be seen as potentially misleading. Importantly, the 
rather than a for-profit enterprise. 
250. Id. at 389. 
25 1 .  Id. 
252. Id. at 394 n.5 .  
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view of the matter that counts is not the lay belief, but the learned 
one. 
Powell's comment comes in dissent, but the majority differs only 
in their assessment of consumer reaction to the speech, not in their 
analytic approach?S3 Both the majority and the dissent make an 
empirical judgment about whether the advertisement is misleading or 
not, and that judgment determines the constitutional status of the 
speech. Both the majority and the dissent rely on their own 
experience and intuition to determine whether the advertisement is 
misleading or not. In the preceding sections, I argued that social 
science reveals that our intuitions about what is moving us, or how 
things affect us, . is often wrong.2S4 There is, however, nothing in 
these cases that suggests that our intuitive presumptions about what 
moves us have strong constitutional standing-indeed, the Court in 
Bates seems to be relying on its own sense that it has a highly 
informed understanding about what does or does not influence 
consumers of legal services. Despite the fact that litigants, and the 
Court itself, often rely on mere intuition to analyze potentially 
"misleading" speech, intuitive presumptions enjoy no sacred status 
and may be repudiated by empirically driven argument seeking to 
impose commercial speech restrictions. 
In another important lawyer advertising case, In re R. M J. ,  255 
for example, the Court recognized that intuitions about what is 
misleading, to whom, and in what contexts, may be wanting, and 
indicated that its ,approach to commercial speech regulation will be 
solicitous of arguments that intuitions are wrong: 
If experience with particular price advertising indicates that 
the public is in fact misled or that disclaimers are 
insufficient to prevent deception, then the matter would 
come to the. Court in an entirely different posture. The 
commercial speech doctrine is itself based in part on certain 
empirical assumptions as to the benefits of advertising. If 
experience proves that certain forms of advertising are in 
fact misleading, although they did not appear at first to be 
'inherently' misleading, the Court must take such experience 
253. See id. at 353-85. 
254. See supra Part II.B. 1 .  
255. 455 U.S. 191  (1 982). 
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into account. 256 
The Court �llso recognizes that specific methods of lawyer 
advertising may present particular dangers, and thus ma1; be 
proscribed altogether. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn,2 7 for 
example, the Court sustained a categorical prohibition of in-person 
promotion of legal services to accident victims, recognizing that such 
a practice is particularly conducive to overreaching and manipulation 
on the part of the lawyer.258 "Although it is argued that personal 
solicitation is valuable because it may apprise a victim of misfortune 
of his legal rights," thus serving the information proliferating 
function of the modern commercial speech doctrine, the Court 
concluded that "�e very plight of that person not only makes him 
more vulnerable to influence but also may make advice all the more 
intrusive. ,,259 
I believe that the lawyer advertising cases provide an excellent 
opportunity to understand how the commercial speech doctrine might 
countenance a ban on the advertising of junk food to children. 
Lawyer advertising is an area in which the Court feels particularly 
confident to make Judgments about consumer vulnerability to 
commercial speech.26 In Bates, the Court wrote: 
256. Id. at 200 n. l l .  The lawyer in In re R. M J. had, in a fairly large font 
on his print advertisement, indicated that he was admitted to practice before 
"THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT." Id. at 1 97. Apparently being 
admitted to the Supreme Court bar requires only the filing of some paperwork, 
provided the applicant is already a member of the bar elsewhere in the United 
States. See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
ADMISSION TO THE BAR, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/bar/barinstructions. 
pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2006); SUPREME 'COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
ApPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
bar/barapplication.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). The In re R. M J. Court 
found that the speech was protected; but only because the government failed to 
allege manipulation, something the Court certainly seemed open to hearing: 
[S]uch a statement could be misleading to the general public 
unfamiliar with the requirements of admission to the Bar of this Court. 
Yet there is no finding to this effect by the Missouri Supreme Court. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the inclusion of this 
information was misleading. Nor does the Rule specifically identify 
this information as potentially misleading . . . .  
In re R. M J., 455 U.S. at 205�6 (emphasis added) . . 
257. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
258. Id. at 467-68. 
259. Id. at 465 (emphasis added). 
260. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977). 
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[B]ecause the public lacks sophistication concerning legal 
services, misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed 
. unimportant in other advertising may be found quite 
"inappropriate in legal advertising . . . .  In sum, we recognize 
that many of the problems in defining the boundary 
between deceptive and nondeceptive advertising remain to 
be resolved, and we expect that the bar will have a special 
role to play in assuring that advertising by attorneys flows 
both freely and cleanly?61 
565 
Once it is understood that many consumers of junk food "lack[] 
sophistication,,262 in relation to junk-food products in the same way 
that the Court appears willing to see consumers lacking 
sophistication with respect to legal services, then the same latitude 
for the regulation of junk-food advertising will open up as the Court 
has indicated would be available to the states in the regulation of 
lawyer advertising. When approaching legal analysis from the 
critical realist perspective, it becomes clear that we, that is, most 
consumers, stand with respect to the power of market actors just as 
vulnerably as legal clients have long been understood to stand with 
respect to the power of lawyers.263 . Social scientists have broadly 
examined our iniuitions about our own "sophistication" and where 
those intuitions might actually pose special "risk[ s] of deception. ,,264 
There may be such a risk of deception in the market for junk food.265 
The Court's reliance in the lawyer advertising cases on its own 
expertise and experience as members of the legal community reveals 
the Court's willingness to credit expertise in the determination of 
whether or 11,0t an advertising practice is misleading. 266 Legislative 
adoption of social scientific findings with respect to junk-food 
26 1 .  Id. at 383-84. 
262. Id. 
263. See id. at 379. 
264. Id. at 404. 
265. There is substantial evidence, summarized supra Part II.B . l ,  that our 
intuitive view of our own eating behavior is mistaken in ways that leave us 
vulnerable to exploitive influence. See also Broken Scales, supra note 3, at 
1675-82 (describing important counter-intuitive features of the human eating 
system). 
266. See generally Bates, 433 U.S. at 383 (reasoning that the public, in 
contrast to legal professionals, lacked the sophistication necessary to realize 
the significance of certain statements in legal advertising). 
! 
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consumption can ;provide that understanding. 267 
To explore more deeply the contours of this jurisprudence, 
consider another la�er advertising case, Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, 68 which involved a lawyer's advertisement 
seeking clients who may have been harmed by the infamous "Dalkon 
Shield" intrauterine device.269 The Court readily accepts the state's 
assertion that the lawyer's advertisement-which stated that "if there 
is no recovery, no legal fees are owed"-was misleading, and hence 
could be banned! outrlght.27o Grappling within an area of its own 
expertise, the Court does not need a social scientist to know which 
way the wind blows: 
The advertisement makes no mention of the distinction 
between "legal fees" and "costs," and to a layman not aware 
of the meaning of these terms of art, the advertisement 
would suggest that employing appellant would be a no-lose 
proposition in that his representation in a losing cause 
would come entirely free of charge. The assumption that 
substantial numbers of potential clients would be so misled 
is hardly a :  speculative . one: it is a commonplace that 
members of the public are often unaware of the technical 
meanings of such terms as "fees" and "costs"-terms that, 
in ordinary usage, might well be virtually interchangeable. 
When the possibility of deception is as self-evident as it is 
in this case, we need not require the State to "conduct a 
267: It is also possible to see some features of the Court's jurisprudence in 
this area as relating more particularly to the substantial interest that people 
have in obtaining access to information about the availability of legal services. 
The Court repeatedly takes notice of the fact that many people often do not 
pursue their legal rights because they do not know how to get a lawyer or how 
much one will cost. Bates, 433 U.S. at 376. The interests at stake in the cases 
are palpable. There is clearly a similarly substantial interest with respect to the 
purchase and consumption of food, a basic and necessary consumer choice of 
nearly every American, and one which also involves significant, though often 
unseen, health risks. 
268. 471 U.S. 626 ( 1985). . 
269. The Dalkon Shield was a popular birth control device, introduced in the 
early 1970s, which came · to be associated with a myriad of serious health 
problems; including birth defects and infertility. See generally MORTON 
MlNTz, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON 
SlllELD (1 985) (discussing corporate disregard for the harms associated with 
the Dalkon Shield, ih the interest of profit maximization). 
270. Zauderer, 47 1 U.S. at 652. 
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survey of the . . . public before it [ may] determine that the 
[ advertisement] . had a tendency to mislead. ,,27 1 
567 
And so the Court upheld the prohibition of lawyer advertisin� 
that promised no "fees" were owed unless the client recovered.27 
The analysis was guided by the Court's learned appreciation of the 
fact that consum�r intuitions jn the consumer context under review 
may be misled by the advertising in ways a mere intuitive or 
common sense understanding of the advertising would misS.273 The 
analysis sanctifies the deployment of counterintuitive understanding 
in the analysis of the constitutional status of commercial speech. 
Also at issue in the case, however, was a state re�lation 
prohibiting the use of any illustrations in lawyer advertising. 74 The 
Court overturned that prohibition, describing the drawing in the 
defendant's advertisement as "an accurate representation of the 
Dalkon Shield. ,,275 The Court touched on the subtler issues, raised 
for the first time in this case, about the power of advertising in a way 
that must be grappled with in any effort to ban junk-food advertising 
to children: 
The use of illustrations in advertising by attorneys, the State 
suggests, creates unacceptable risks that the public will be 
misled, manipulated, or confused. Abuses associated with 
the visual content of advertising are particularly difficult to 
police, because the advertiser is skilled in subtle uses of 
illustrations to play on the emotions of his audience and 
convey fals� impressions. Because illustrations may 
produce their effects by operating on a subconscious level, 
the State argues, it will be difficult for the State to point to 
any particular illustration and prove that it is misleading or 
manipulative. Thus . . .  the State's argument is that its 
purposes can. only be served through a prophylactic rule.276 
The Court rejected the State's argument, but it is important to 
see, it rejected it on empirical grounds-that is, on the grounds that 
the State did not provide evidence, such as social scientific evidence, 
27 1 .  Id. at 652-53 (internal citations omitted). 
272. See id. at 653. 
273. See id. at 652. 
274. Id. at 633-34. 
275. Id. at 647. 
276. Id. at 648. 
HeinOnline -- 39 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 568 2006
568 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA W  REVIEW [Vo1. 39:507 
in support of its ; argument concerning the power of illustnitions in 
lawyer advertising: 
The State's arguments amount to little more than 
unsupported assertions: nowhere does the State cite any 
evidence or authority of any kind for its contention that the 
potential abuses associated with the use of illustrations in 
attorneys' advertising cannot be combated by any means 
short of a blanket ban . . . .  
Thus, acceptance of the State's argument would be 
tantamount to adoption of the principle that a State may 
prohibit the luse of pictures or illustrations in connection 
with advertising of any product or service simply on the 
strength of the general argument that the visual content of 
advertisements may, under some circumstances, be 
deceptive or manipulative. But . . .  broad prophylactic rules 
may not be so lightly justified if the protections afforded 
commercial speech are to retain their force. We are not 
persuaded that identifying deceptive or manipulative uses of 
visual media in advertising is so intrinsically burdensome 
that the State is entitled to forgo that task in favor of the 
more convenient but far more restrictive alternative of a 
blanket ban on the use of illustrations?77 
In Zauderer, the government once again stipulated that the 
advertising actually at issue in the case, including the illustration 
used in the advertising, was not misleading.278 The government, 
therefore, was stuck arguing that the threat of misleading illustrations 
in advertising was so great that it justified banning even the 
assertedly nonmisleading advertisement that the Court had in front of 
it.279 Such an argument is insufficient to rebut the dispositionist 
intuitions that the Court is left to employ in its review of the 
advertising prohibitions; such intuitions presume that information is 
useful to consumers, not that it is manipulative?80 It is little surprise 
then that the state's abstract claims about the manipulative power of 
illustrations in advertising were unavailing. .The analysis, however, 
277. Id. at 648-49 (emphasis added). 
278. Id. at 634. 
279. See id. at 649. 
280. Id. 
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might look very different upon the adoption of a critical realist view, 
backed by social science, about how consumers actually respond to 
different kinds of advertising with respect to particular services or 
goods. The Court's own treatment of the "fees" and "costs" issue, 
guided by its own casual empiricism in the specific area of legal 
services, suggests availing precedent for such an analytic 
endeavor.281 
In Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of 
Illinois,282 in reviewing the Illinois Supreme Court's sanctioning of 
an attorney for using letterhead that the Illinois court deemed 
misleading with respect to the lawyer's credentials,283 the Court made 
clear that it would "exercise de novo review" over a lower court's 
holding that contested commercial speech was misleading, 
281 .  My point in discussing Zauderer has been to suggest both the Court's 
demand for, and its openness to, evidentiary support for prohibitions against 
"misleading" methods of advertising that are counterintuitive or unfamiliar. 
Nevertheless, lest Zauderer be thought to require too burdensome a showing 
before a state may ban a method of advertising, it should be emphasized that it 
was only after Zauderer that the Court fIrst explicitly stated that, in the 
commercial speech context, the least restrictive means are not required before 
the Court would sanction a regulation furthering a substantial government 
interest. See id. at 65 1-52 n. 14. In Board of Trustees of the State University of 
New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 ( 1989), the Court clarifIed: 
[W]hile we have insisted that "the free flow of commercial 
information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would­
be regulators the costs of distinguishing . . .  the harmless from the 
harmful," we have not gone so far as to impose upon them the burden 
of demonstrating that the distinguishment is 1 00% complete, or that 
the manner of restriction is absolutely the least severe that will achieve 
the desired end. What our decisions require is a "fIt between the 
legislature'S ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends," a 
fIt that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable . . .  
Id. at 480 (emphasis added) (omission in original). 
282. 496 U.S. 91  (1990). 
283. The letterhead stated that the lawyer was a "'CertifIed Civil Trial 
Specialist-By the National Board of Trial Advocacy'" and "'Licensed [by] 
Illinois, Missouri, and Arizona. ,,, Id. at 96. The Illinois Supreme Court held 
that the letterhead was unprotected by the First Amendment because it was 
" 'misleading,'" in that consumers " 'could'" be led to believe that the attorney 
was '" certifIed '" by some government agency and that such certifIcation 
"'tacitly attests ' "  to the lawyer's qualifIcations, when in fact the certifIcation 
came from a private organization with no government mandate or authority. 
Id. at 98-99. 
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positioning the issue squarely as one of law.284 In its de novo review 
in Peel, the Court explicitly confirmed its previously-implicit view 
that there is a jurisprudential presumption that "truthful, relevant 
information,,285 is not misleading: "The Commission's concern about 
the possibility of, deception in hypothetical cases is not sufficient to 
rebut the constitutional presumption favoring disclosure over 
concealment. ,,286 Where there is no factual evidence presented to 
rebut that presumption, then the issue of whether or not advertising is 
"misleading" must be decided only by judicial discretion-and where 
hunches are decisive, the Court's hunches trump all others?87 
Because no. evidence was presented to the contrary, the 
presumption that the factually true statements in Peel's letterhead 
were not misleading prevailed: "We reject the paternalistic 
assumption that the recipients of petitioner's letterhead are no more 
discriminating than the audience for children's television . . . .  Given 
the complete absence of any evidence of deception in the present 
case, we must reject the contention that petitioner's letterhead is 
actually misleading.,,288 The Court's incantation of "paternalism" 
here means something very different than does its use of the same 
term in Virginia Pharmacy?89 In Virginia Pharmacy the Court used 
the term to refer to the illegitimacy of the government's concern that 
people would use truthful, nonmisleading information in a manner 
contrary to their own best interests;290 here the concern is with the 
characterization of whether people are in fact misled by information 
or not. The foriner is normative, but the latter is positive, with 
normative implications. Where the positive question is argued on 
284. Id. at 108. 
285 . . Id. 
286. Id. at 1 1 1 . 
287. See id. at 108-1 1 .  
288. Id. at 105-06. Applying its de novo review, the Peel Court found that 
''the letterhead was neither actually nor inherently misleading." Id. at 1 10. 
Relying again on its · own knowledge and experience, the Court was "satisfied 
that the consuming public understands that licenses [to drive cars, to operate 
radio stations, to sell liquor] are issued by governmental authorities and that a 
host of certificates [to commend job performance, to convey an educational 
degree, to commemorate a solo flight or a hole in one] are issued by private 
organizations." Id. at 103 .  
289. See supra Part III.A.2. 
290. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976). 
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intuition, the Court is  very willing to substitute its own judgment for 
that of the government or the lower court that it is reviewing; but the 
Court has nevertheless indicated a willingness to show deference to 
actual findings by the government regarding what is misleading or 
not.291 
. Having glimpsed the Court's latent sensitivity to the situational 
character in these lawyer-advertising cases, I return now to the 
Court's assessment of Massachusetts's billboard tobacco advertising 
ban in Lorillard. Again the government waived the first part of the 
Central Hudson test and stipulated that the advertising it sought to 
ban was not false or misleading?92 Thus, the principle opinion had 
no occasion to depart from the dispositionist presumptions at the 
heart of the commercial speech doctrine, and no reason to examine 
the advertising regulation at issue as doing anything other than 
"imping[ing] on the speaker's ability to propose a commercial 
transaction and the adult listener's opportunity to obtain information 
about products. ,,293 . 
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in Lorillard, while calling 
for the application of strict scrutiny and the abandonment of any 
"commercial spyech" category of First Amendment analysis, 
provides a provocative suggestion for how government might build 
the case for an advertising ban that could effectively respond to the 
problem of unseen manipulation within advertisements and still pass . 
constitutional muster?94 After highlighting that Massachusetts had 
waived the question of whether the prohibited advertising was false 
291 .  Another lawyer advertising case, Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass 'n, 486 U.S. 
466 (1 988), for example, can be seen to signal the Court's appreciation that 
"puffery" can be misleading in a way that may permit a legislature to regulate 
the form and context, the situating of otherwise truthful, nondeceptive speech: 
"To be sure, a[n] I [advertisement] letter may be misleading if it unduly 
emphasizes trivial or 'relatively uninformative fact[s]. ' "  Id. at 479. In 
Shapero the Court remanded for a finding as to whether the emphasis at issue 
in the advertising before it was "undue," and therefore "misleading." Id. at 
479-80. 
292. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (200 1). 
293. Id. at 565. Sensing that there might be something more subtle, and 
possibly pernicious, happening in the tobacco advertising at issue, Justice 
Stevens would have remanded the case for further development of the issues. 
Id. The Court declines to do so because "the State had ample opportunity to 
develop a record," and had not done so. Id. 
294. Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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1 
or misleading, Thomas chastised the state for nevertheless filling its 
briefs with arguments about the misleading power of tobacco 
advertising.295 He then responded to the issue himself, with language 
that may prove useful to the kind of advertising regulation I have in 
mind: 
Respondents suggest that tobacco advertising is misleading 
because "its youthful imagery and . . .  sheer ubiquity" leads 
children to �believe "that tobacco use is desirable and 
pervasive." . . . [S]ee also Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae 7 ("[S]o many children lack the maturity in 
judgment to resist the tobacco industry'S appeals to 
excitement, glamour, and independence"). This 
justification is belied, however, by the sweeping 
overinclusivity of the regulations. Massachusetts has done 
nothing to target its prohibition to advertisements appealing 
to "excitement, glamour, and independence";  the ban 
applies with equal force to appeals to torpor, homeliness, 
and servility·. It has not focused on "youthful imagery"; 
\ . 
smokers depicted on the sides of buildings may no more 
play shuffleboard than they may ride skateboards.296 
The tone is sardonic, but it should not be dismissed as 
unserious-it reflects a theme that runs throughout the Court's 
commercial speech jurisprudence. It suggests that a ban that focused 
on promotional methods traditionally dismissed as mere "puffery," or 
other methods that were unrelated to the perceived informational 
value of commercial speech, would be constitutionally 
permissible,297 
This concept is undertheorized in existing case law. Part of the 
work of this Article is to help flesh it out. Presently, incoherence 
tends to emerge in the Court's efforts to span the . profound gap 
295. ld. at 578. In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 
357 (2002), the Court stated: 
The dissent may . . .  be suggesting that the Government has an interest 
in banning the advertising of compounded drugs because patients who 
see such advertisements will be confused about the drugs' risks . . . .  
This argument is precluded, however, by the fact that the Government 
does not argue that the advertisements are misleading. 
Id. at 376. . � 
296. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 578. 
297. [d. at 571-90. 
. 
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between the core justification for protecting commercial speech, and 
the reality of the unseen, manipulative power of much contemporary 
commercial advertising. Thomas, for example, wrote: 
[T]he State's apparent view [is] that the simple existence of 
tobacco advertisements misleads people into believing that 
tobacco use is more pervasive than it actually is. The State 
misunderstands the purpose of advertising. Promoting a 
product that is not yet pervasively used (or a cause that is 
not yet widely supported) is a primary purpose of 
advertising. Tobacco advertisements would be no more 
misleading for suggesting pervasive use of tobacco products 
than are any other advertisements that attempt to expand a 
market for a product, or to rally support for a political 
movement. Any inference from the advertisements that 
businesses would like for tobacco use to be pervasive is 
entirely reasonable, and advertising that gives rise to that 
inference is in no way deceptive.298 
While Thomas's characterization of "the State's apparent view" 
of the situational power of advertising is incomplete, it is, once 
again, not a bad start.299 His reply to the problem posed by that 
view, however, is a non sequitur. That the advertising accomplishes 
what the advertiser wants it to do---expand the market for its 
product-is hardly evidence that it is not misleading, as Thomas 
seems to argue. The idea that he started out criticizing was that 
advertising, or the "sheer ubiquity" of tobacco advertising noted in 
the previous quote from Thomas, misleadingly makes it look like 
smoking is more prevalent than it actually is, and thus induces more 
consumption of the product than it would if it were not misleading in 
that fashion.30o Indeed, such an argument would be well supported 
by social psychological findings with respect to human belief 
formation.301 But Thomas insists that the more reasonable inference 
298. Id. at 578-79 (emphasis added). 
299. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10 (employing Thomas's 
summary take on the problem of childhood obesity). 
300. See id. 
301 .  See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 2 1 ,  
at 1 1 3-15 (discussing social psychology's fmdings regarding the "false 
consensus" effect and "pluralistic ignorance," and the vulnerability to 
manipulation that these processes suggest). 
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is . . .  that tobacco advertisers or other advertisers want there to be 
more consumption of their prOduct than there currently is.302 The 
issue of the advertising being misleading is left sitting there, still 
waiting for some comprehensive jurisprudential integration. 
It is important at this juncture to make the point that although 
the Court's presumption that truthful commercial speech is not 
misleading is not fatal to the junk-food advertising ban proposed by 
this Article, it is, . nevertheless, a misguided . presumption. The 
presumption is neither theoretically nor empirically supported-it is 
advanced by intuitive dispositionism and an under-theorized "anti­
paternalism. ,,303 Indeed, in light of the analysis in the foregoing 
sections, it might seem that commercial speech should be considered 
presumptively misleading, and thus presumptively subject to 
regulation. 
The core of the commercial speech doctrine rests on the 
assumption that market actors respond to pre-existing consumer 
preferences and that commercial speech facilitates the satisfaction of 
those preferences.304 In this Article, I have emphasized that 
commercial speech in the form of mass-marketed advertising often 
influences consumers in powerful ways that consumers do not 
anticipate or appreciate, and that exercising such situational 
influence can be extremely profitable to corporations. The Court 
recognizes that commercial speech can remain robust even in the 
face of aggressive regulation-the profit motive will find a way to 
comport with the regulation and still be heard.305 For the very same 
reason, corporate speech that is not regulated will discover and 
comport with whatever methods of advertising will accomplish the 
manipulation of the consumer in the most profitable fashion. 
The very robustness of commercial speech should give rise to a 
suspicion about the unseen power of such speech. When one begins 
with the situational character, and appreciates the situational power 
of advertising and the ability of powerful corporations to exercise 
that power, the analysis suggests that if any presumption is adopted, 
the presumption should be that the advertising will be misleading. 
302. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 578-79. 
303. Cf David Yosifon, Choice Fetishism and the Libertarian Paternalist 
Imagination (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
304. See supra text accompanying notes 166-172. 
305. See supra text accompanying notes 179-180. 
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This presumptio� is also warranted because, as the analysis above 
suggests, it will prove extremely difficult for dipositionist 
individuals, governments, and courts to perceive the misleading 
qualities of the advertising, and take issue with them.306 
2. Reconciling Posadas and 44 Liquourmart: Towards a Critical 
Realist Understanding of the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
Up to this point, my argument has been that where the Court 
sees consumer behavior as reflecting individual, dispositional choice, 
it rebuffs commercial speech regulation. Where it appreciates that 
there are powerful situational influences on consumer behavior, 
where behavior is or threatens to be misled by the advertising, rather 
than the advertising abetting a consumer choice, regulation is 
allowable. The Court clearly has a dispositionist prejudice: the 
government has the burden of showing situational influence. 307 The 
Court seems to recognize that in areas where its own expertise is 
limited (perhaps all areas outside of the regulation of lawyers) the 
government may be the authority on how consumers respond to 
different types of advertising.308 Advocates of commercial speech 
regulation have focused too heavily on the second part of the Central 
Hudson test, to the detriment of a richer understanding of the 
commercial speech doctrine--<>ne capable of sustaining the ban I 
propose. 
In promulgating such a ban, it would be critical for government 
to cease searching for legitimate reasons to suppress the effect of 
advertising that the government admits is truthful and non­
misleading. That approach is too vulnerable to normative and 
doctrinal cries of paternalism. The purpose and design of speech 
regulation must instead be to ensure that advertising does not 
overreach and manipulate consumers in ways they do not anticipate 
or appreciate-such a purpose is much easier to justify and fits 
within the Court's teachings. To enable such a regulatory proj ect, 
legal theory can show that much more of commercial speech is 
misleading than mere intuition supposes, and that far less consumer 
behavior reflects rational, dispositional behavior than is commonly 
believed. 
306. See supra text accompanying notes 198-200. 
307. See supra te�t accompanying notes 238-239. 
308. See supra Part III.B . 1 .  
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With this aim in mind, I would like to address the widely shared 
belief that the most recent commercial speech cases, such as 44 
Liquormart and Lorillard, represent a clear ratcheting-up of 
commercial speech protection on the part of the COurt.309 I will 
focus on the widely shared view of commentators that 44 Liquormart 
overruled Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of 
Puerto Rico,3 lo and expunged any remnants of that controversial 
case, and its permissive posture towards commercial speech 
regulation, from the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence. 
Posadas was a 1986 decision that upheld a Puerto Rico law 
forbidding all casino advertising to Puerto Rico residents by casinos 
within Puerto RicO.3 l 1  The law did not forbid casinos from directing 
their advertising at non-resident tourists within or outside its 
territory.3 12 
As usual, the government did not argue that the advertising it 
sought to restrict was false or misleading; instead the government 
passed directly to claiming that the restriction nevertheless 
accomplished a substantial government interest in reducing citizen 
gambling in a sufficiently tailored fashion.3 13  I have argued that a 
central vein running through the modem commercial speech cases, 
from Virginia Pharmacy through 44 Liquormart, is that the 
government may not suppress dispositional decision-making through 
speech regulation. Posadas may thus seem anomalous, as most 
commentators suggest.3 14  Close examination of the case, however, 
suggests that Posadas never really departed from this principle, and 
further that Posadas actually reflects the imminent appreciation of 
I 
the situational character that I have suggested has always been a part 
of the commercial speech doctrine. Under my analysis, Posadas, 
309. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and 
Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquonnart, 1996 SUP. CT. REv. 123 
(concluding many Supreme Court Justices have begun to give commercial 
speech close to full First Amendment protection). 
3 10. 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
3 1 1 . Id. at 347-48. 
3 12. Id. at 362 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
3 1 3. Id. at 342-43. Justice Stevens analyzed the Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection issues raised by Puerto Rico's ban. See id. at 359-63. 
3 14. See Mitchel� N. Bennan, Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at "The Greater Includes the Lesser, " 55 
V AND. 1. REv. 693 (2002) (summarizing academic critiques of Posadas). 
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which the Court has never explicitly overruled, survives to aid the 
junk-food advertising ban I propose, while 44 Liquormart would not 
bar it. 
Posadas can be reconciled with the central principle that the 
First Amendment forbids suppression of truthful nonmisleading 
speech for the purpose of repressing dispositional choice, if it is seen 
that that despite the fact that the government did not argue the issue, 
the Court appreciated that Puerto Rico actually sought to suppress 
casino advertising because of its misleading influence, in powerful, 
unseen ways, on Puerto Rico residents.3 1 S  Writing for the Court, 
Justice Rehnquist noted that "[t]he particular kind of commercial 
speech at issue here, namely, advertising of casino gambling aimed 
at the residents of Puerto Rico, concerns a lawful activity and is not 
misleading or fraudulent, at least in the abstract.,,3 16  But in his 
analysis, Justice Rehnquist leaves the abstract behind and speculates 
about the reality of casino advertising: 
Appellant contends . . .  that the First Amendment requires 
the Puerto Rico Legislature to reduce demand for casino 
gambling among the residents of Puerto Rico not by 
suppressing commercial speech that might encourage such 
gambling, but by promulgating additional speech designed 
to discourage it. We reject this contention. We think it is 
up to the legislature to decide whether or not such a 
"counterspeech" policy would be as effective in reducing 
the demand for casino gambling as a restriction on 
advertising. The legislature could conclude, as it apparently 
did here, that residents of Puerto Rico are already aware of 
the risks of casino gambling, yet would nevertheless be 
induced by widespread advertising to engage in such 
3 1 5. On this reading, the only thing that was "wrong" with Posadas, from a 
doctrinal standpoint, was its acceptance of a total advertising ban, not its 
countenancing the Puerto Rican legislature's avowed purpose of reducing its 
own citizens' casino gambling habits. Yet, the Court may have been moved in 
some measure by the fact that Puerto Rico residents were no doubt aware of 
the availability of casino gambling, due to all of the advertising directed at 
tourists on the island. For a similar discussion regarding United States v. Edge 
Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 4 1 8  (1993), see infra text accompanying notes 
325-332. 
3 1 6. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 340-41 
(1986) (emphasis added). 
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potentially hhrmful conduct.3 1 7  
Language such as this provides grounds for a jurisprudential 
understanding that, while the core of the commercial speech doctrine 
views advertising as proliferating information that enables 
consumers to make informed, dispositionally driven choices, it also 
appreciates that. other advertising might threaten to induce 
consumption in a way that is not reflective of dispositional choice, 
and which may be subject to regulation without offending 
constitutional values.3 IS Where the Court strikes down advertising 
I 
restrictions, it does so because it sees the restraint of free choice; 
where regulation of advertising is allowed it is not because it is 
thought that it is constitutionally permissible to interfere with free 
choice, but, rather, because it is understood that choice is not at issue 
at all, and what the regulatiori is doing is preventing inducement or 
3 1 7. Id. at 344 (emphasis omitted) (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist goes 
on to cite Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718  F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc): 
"We do not believe that a less restrictive time, place restriction, such as a 
disclaimer warning of the dangers of alcohol, would be effective. The state's 
concern is not that f the public is unaware of the dangers of alcohol. . . .  The 
concern instead is that advertising will unduly promote alcohol consumption 
despite known dangers." Id. at 75 1 (emphasis added). 
3 1 8. For example, consider a hypothetical casino advertising campaign 
repeatedly showing a woman at a roulette table smiling widely, celebrating a 
winning spin, the name and location of the casino appearing superimposed 
over the image or images. If a legislature were to take notice of the fact that 
humans tend to make probability assessments in terms of how easily examples 
of particular outcomes come to mind, rather than by analyzing mathematical 
fashion the actual likelihood of an outcome, then a legislature would be 
justified in finding this hypothetical advertising campaign to be misleading 
with respect to a gambler's chances of winning at roulette. See Hanson & 
Y osifon, The Situational Character, supra note 2 1 ,  at 67-71 .  What appears to 
be unremarkable or unactionable puffery when one begins with a stylized 
rational actor conception of human decision-making becomes highly 
significant when one begins with a more truthful understanding of how humans 
think. Nothing in the First Amendment requires Congress to patronize a 
particular conception of the human mind when passing regulations to forbid 
misleading commercial speech, which under most views of the First 
Amendment is a permissible government purpose. See, e.g. , In re R.M.J., 455 
U.S. 1 9 1 ,  203 (1982) (noting that states can prohibit misleading advertising). 
This picture of the First Amendment gives credence to the CoUrt's oft repeated 
assurance that "if there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate . . .  
information . . .  it is a. danger contemplated by the Framers of the First 
Amendment." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 
(1 978); see infra Part IV (analyzing Bellotti). 
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stimulation that has little to do with consumer choice.3 19 How 
advertising will be viewed in · a particular case depends strongly on 
whether it is analyzed through a conceptual framework based in 
intuition, or one steeped in social science. 
This analysis also aids Rehnquist's otherwise dubious claim in 
Posadas that Puerto Rico may impose its casino advertising ban 
because "the gr�ater power to completely ban casino gambling 
necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino 
gambling . . . .  ,,320 The Court had renounced that position in Virginia 
Pharmacy; indeed, the falsity of that view with respect to 
commercial speech is the whole point of the modem commercial 
speech doctrine. But Rehnquist's statement, read as part of the 
"inducement" argument I am highlighting here, evades the tangles of 
the Court's unconstitutional conditions doctrine altogether. 32 1 
Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
It would . . .  surely be a strange constitutional doctrine 
which would concede to the legislature the authority to 
totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature 
the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the 
product or activity through advertising on behalf of those 
who would profit from such increased demand.322 
Rehnquist'S argument here rests on a very different conception 
3 19. Compare Lorillard Tobacco Co. v: Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 565 (2001) 
(striking down advertising restrictions that prevented adults from obtaining 
information about l�gal products), with Posadas, 478 U.S. at 348 (upholding 
ban on the advertising of gambling casinos aimed at Puerto Rico residents). 
320. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46. 
321 .  The Court later explicitly repudiates the "greater power includes the 
lesser" argument as applied to the regulation of commercial speech. See 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517  U.S. 484, 5 1 3  (1996): 
Even though government is under no obligation to provide a person, 
or the public, a particular benefit, it does not follow that conferral of 
the benefit may be conditioned on the surrender of a constitutional 
right. . . .  Thus, just as it is perfectly clear that Rhode Island could not 
ban all obscene liquor ads except those that advocated temperance, we 
think it equally. clear that its power to ban the sale of liquor entirely 
does not include a power to censor all advertisements that contain 
accurate and nonmisleading information about the price of the 
product. 
Id. ; see a/so Berman, supra note 3 14, at 726-30 (explaining the "greater power 
including the lesser" doctrine). 
322. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346 (emphasis added). 
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of the relationship between advertising and human behavior than that 
reflected in the downward-:-sloping demand curve trope of Virginia 
Pharmacy, but it does not rest on a different view of what is 
permissible in commercial speech regulation.323 Rehnquist's 
argument is one that sees the consumer as a situational character, one 
vulnerable . to "the stimulation of demand" 324 . that could be 
accomplished through the unseen influence of advertising. This 
figure, I have been arguing, while usually in the background, is no 
stranger to the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence. The 
government may not regulate speech where doing so interferes with 
dispositional choice; what it may do, however, is regulate 
commercial speech that merely "stimulates" demand for the product 
by exercising situational influence over vulnerable situational 
characters. A similar view is evident in United States v. Edge 
Broadcasting Co. ,325 a post-Posadas case in which the Court upheld 
a federal statute forbidding radio stations located in states that 
prohibited lotteries from broadcasting advertisements for lotteries, 
even if the advertisements concerned lotteries in adjacent states.326 
The majority sustained the total ban.327 
In Edge, the state once again waived the first step of the Central 
Hudson analysis. Thus, the Court again did not squarely analyze the 
potential falsity or misleading nature of the proscribed advertising. 
Nevertheless, in considering the second part of the Central Hudson 
test, whether the ban was narrowly tailored to accomplish the state's 
asserted interest in curbing lottery consumption, the Court again 
revealed a sensitivity to the situational character, and an appreciation 
that commercial speech might mislead consumers in powerful, 
unseen ways that are not entitled to constitutional protection. This is 
not fully articulated in the Court's opinion, but read closely its 
analysis is fascinating. 
323. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 764 ( 1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
324. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346. 
325 . . 509 U.S. 4 18, 432-33 (1993). The newly appointed Chief Justice John 
Roberts was on the brief for the government as Deputy Solicitor General in 
support of the constitutionality of the statute. Brief for Petitioners, United 
States v. Edge Broad. Co., No. 92-486 (1993). 
326. Edge Broad. , 509 U.S. at 432-33. 
327. See id. 
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At a crucial :point in Edge, the Court turn s  to the radio station's 
claim that the regulation should be struck because the ban was not fit 
to serve, and did not serve, the purpose that the state claimed for it.328 
The radio station argued that consumers living at the northern tip of 
North Carolina, where the station at issue was broadcasting, were 
inevitably apprised of the fact that there was a lottery going on just 
across the border in Virginia, how much it cost to play, where tickets 
could be bought, etc.329 Consumers learned such information from 
advertising circulating from Virginia into North Carolina, and they 
even heard about it on their radios while listening to radio stations 
broadcasting from Virginia?30 The Court rejected this argument and 
provocatively, if incompletely, recognized that advertising may 
affect listeners in ways unrelated to informing dispositional 
choice.331  The Court seemed to appreciate that the constant 
repetition of advertising might have some other effect on consumers 
that a legislature could remedy without violating the First 
Amendment: 
Even if all of the residents of Edge's North Carolina service 
area listen to lottery ads from Virginia stations, it would 
still be true :that 1 1  % of radio listening time in that area 
would remain free of such material. If Edge is allowed to 
advertise the Virginia lottery, the percentage of listening 
time carrying such material would increase from 38% to 
49%. We do not think that Central Hudson compels us to 
consider this consequence to be without significance.332 
328. Id. at 429. If the regulation did not advance the asserted government 
interest it would be restricting commercial speech for no good reason, and 
would fail the Central Hudson test. See supra Part III.A.2. 
329. Edge Broad. , 509 U.S. at 43 1-33. 
330. Id. at 418 .  
3 3 1 .  [d. at 435. 
332. [d. at 432-33. Edge Broadcasting is another good case illustrating the 
Court's concern about total bans; it seems that one of the reasons that the Court 
upholds the prohibition is because citizens are otherwise exposed to 
infonnation about the lottery, so the intuitive downward-sloping demand curve 
tale can be satisfied. Indeed, under the analysis advanced here, the fact that 
residents of North Carolina are apprised of the existence of the lottery and on 
what tenns participation may be had, would cut in favor of North Carolina's 
regulation-it seems doubtful that the Court would have sustained the ban if its 
effect were to keep ;North Carolina residents entirely ignorant of the fact that 
there are lotteries in Virginia. 
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There is something about the "consequence" of being exposed to 
eleven percent more lottery advertising that is allowed to matter in 
the commercial speech doctrine. There is something in this 
"consequence" that the government permissibly sought to remedy 
when it "legislated on the premise that the advertising of gambling 
serves to increase the demand for the advertised product. . . .  even if 
the North Carolina audience is not wholly unaware of the lottery's 
existence. ,,333 : .  
Without Bassing at least intermediate-and for some justices, strict scrutiny 34_the government may not prevent the dissemination 
of truthful, nondeceptive, nonmisleading information about lawful 
activities. It apparently may never prohibit truthful nonmisleading 
commercial speech for the purpose of retarding dispositional choice. 
But in truth, nobody ever really argues that the First Amendment 
countenances the use of speech regulation to suppress free choice on 
the paternalistic . grounds that people make bad choices when 
presented with truthful, nonmisleading speech. Rather, as my 
treatment of the cases has argued, the government's concern is 
usually, at heart, that the advertising is powerfully misleading in 
ways consumers do not appreciate. 
The structure of the Central Hudson test de-emphasizes the 
inquiry about the false or misleading nature of commercial speech. 
However, as I have argued, the Court has recognized that the 
government has discretion to determine what kind of advertising is 
misleading, and in certain circumstances may conclude that whole 
I 
333. Id. at 434. Such a premise would find support both in social science 
and corporate practice. The "mere exposure effect" is a well-documented 
phenomenon · in social psychology that refers to the fact that merely being 
exposed to a particular stimulus will · influence subjects' subsequent 
preferences for the stimulus, even where they have no conscious awareness 
that they had been previously exposed to it. For example, subjects exposed to 
pictograms at a rate too rapid for them to consciously notice, will later prefer 
the pictogram they were exposed to over one that they had never been exposed 
to. See Hanson & Y osifon, The Situational Character, supra note 2 1 ,  at 44-
50. Contemporary commercial advertising campaigns bear witness to 
corporate understanding of this phenomenon. See, e.g. , Rachel Deahl, Get 'Em 
While They 're Young: Do Chains Change How Students Think About 
Bookstores, BOOK STANDARD, July 1 , 2005, http://www.thebookstandard.coml 
bookstandardlnews/retaiVartic1e _ display.isp?vnu_ contenUd= 1 00097271 1 . 
334. Chief Justice Roberts's support for Central Hudson as Deputy Solicitor 
General, see supra note 325, probably yields little insight into how he will 
approach the commercial speech doctrine as a jurist. 
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methods of advertising are misleading. The government will stand 
on firmer ground in this respect · when it relies on contemporary 
social science, in particular social psychology, which suggests that 
far more of contemporary advertising may rightly be called 
"misleading" than may be intuitively suspected under a common 
sense, intuitively grounded conception of human decision-making. 
One of the reasons that the commercial speech doctrine is 
underdeveloped is because government has not embraced a satisfying 
theoretical justification for the restrictions it seeks to impose. 
Government interest in curbing the misleading and exploitive power 
of advertising requires a steady commitment to the critical analysis 
of commercial speech and to the nature of human agency. 
Dispositionism cannot provide the necessary theoretical under­
pinnings for an :effective and justifiable approach to commercial 
speech regulation, leaving · such efforts vulnerable to the cries of 
paternalism and "mind control,,335 that are used by critics of such 
regulation to influence jurists, legislatures and legal theorists. My 
argument endeavors not only to deepen understanding of the 
possibilities of the commercial speech doctrine, but also to provide a 
deeper understanding of the purposes of commercial speech 
regulation. 
I 
3 .  Tombstone Blues-Banning Junk-Food Advertising to Children 
The problem with junk-food advertising, as I described in the 
previous section, is that it influences consumers' thoughts and 
behaviors in powerful ways that they do not anticipate or appreciate. 
These influences may be highly detrimental, or even deadly. Earlier 
I explored this reality through an inquiry into the power of "puffing" 
to influence consumption in ways that consumers, contemporary 
regulatory regimes, and the common law. do not appreciate, and 
which has therefore long gone unregulated.336 The tombstone blues 
is a proposal aimed at prohibiting tactics such as "puffing," and other 
powerful, unnamed methods of influence, in the advertising of junk­
food products to children. The proposal comports with the 
commercial speech doctrine, as this Article has thus far analyzed 
it. 337 
· 335. See Redish, supra note 1 53, at 639. 
336. See supra Part II.C.2. 
337. These arguments easily support a refashioning of the puffery doctrine in 
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The commercial speech doctrine will not sustain an absolute ban 
on all advertising . . Where a regulation bans all commercial speech 
regarding a legal product or service, a central justification for 
allowing greater regulation in the commercial speech context-the 
robustness of commercial speech and the wherewithal of commercial 
enterprises to get valuable speech out in ways other than that 
prohibited by government · regulation-is no longer in play.338 
Without the robustness justification, review of total bans approaches 
the strict scrutiny standard that the Court applies to regulation of 
non-commercial speech. 339 Further, an absolute advertising ban 
necessarily includes a ban on price advertising, providing an easy 
opportunity to exercise the core dispositionist script concerning the 
relationship between markets, advertising, and consumer behavior, 
which resides at the heart of the commercial speech doctrine.34o 
Thus, the tombstone blues is not a complete ban. The Court's 
jurisprudence instead counsels in favor of a near complete ban, but 
one that still allows advertising in a limited, highly prescribed 
tombstone forma�. Junk-food advertising would be limited to a brief 
description or picture of the . product, its price, information about 
where · it can be purchased and basic nutritional information. The 
tombstone blues approach insures that useful information is produced 
and circulated, while it restricts the kind of manipulation that 
corporations use freely under the present regulatory framework. It 
makes good on · the central promise of the commercial speech 
doctrine to endow the information proliferating power of commercial 
regards to advertising directed at children; I will argue that they support a 
general refashioning of the puffery doctrine. As the social science reviewed 
earlier makes clear, children do not distinguish between statements of fact and 
sales-pitch "boasting." Story & French, supra note 74, at 3 .  Nevertheless, for 
reasons explored earlier and reiterated het:e, I .  believe that an effective ban of 
junk-food advertising to children requires banning nearly all such advertising 
to adults as well. Thus, I examine the constitutional viability of a near total 
ban on junk-food advertising to adults. See supra text accompanying notes 
1 50-163. 
· 338. See supra text accompanying notes 222-223. 
339. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 5 17  U.S. 484, 502 (1996) 
("[N]either the 'greater objectivity' nor the 'greater hardiness' of truthful, 
nonmisleading comfuercial speech justifies reviewing its complete suppression 
with added deference."). 
340. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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speech with First Amendment protection,341 because it only bans 
non-informational content. While some valuable speech may be 
curbed by a tombstone blues ban, the sacrifice is marginal in light of 
the grave social problem it may help solve.342 
The federal government's traditionally strict limitation on 
advertising to promote a public offering of securities is an example 
of the kind of ban I propose.343 Prior to SEC approval of a public 
offering's registration statement, written advertisements344 of the 
proposed sale have, · until very recently, been limited to what was 
known as a "tombstone" format that did "no more than identify the 
security, state the price thereof, state by whom orders will be 
executed, and contain such other information as the [SEC] . . . may 
permit. ,,345 No other written advertising of the securities, let alone 
34 1 .  N.Y. Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
342. But see Zywicki et aI., supra note 76. 
343. See generally Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First 
Amendment, 24 GA . L. REv. 223 (1990) (providing a comprehensive analysis 
of the relationship between the commercial speech doctrine and federal 
securities regulation). In December of 2005, the SEC implemented significant 
reforms in its regulation of securities offerings. E.g. , Securities Act of 1 933, 
1 7  C.F.R. § 230. 134 (2005); see also FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & 
JACOBSON LLP, MEMORANDUM TO OUR FRIENDS AND CLIENTS, SECURITIES 
OFFERING REFORM: A SYNOPSIS (2005), http://www.ffhsj .com/cmemos/ 
050822%20securities_%200ffering%20Jeform.pdf (summarizing the new 
rules regarding communications in a public offering of securities, as well as 
providing some comparison to the old rules). While the December 2005 
amendments may undercut to some degree the utility of the federal regulation 
of securities advertising as a living example of the kind of regulatory regime I 
am arguing would be wise and viable for junk-food advertising, the securities 
regime as it existed prior to the amendments nevertheless remains a useful 
programmatic and justificatory touchstone for my project. It remains to be 
seen what effect the December 2005 amendments will have on consumer 
protection concerns in the securities market. 
344. The securities rules use "[t]he term 'prospectus' [that] means any 
prospectus, notice, Circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or 
by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of 
any security." 1 5  U.S .C . § 77b (a)(10) ( 1982). 
345. Id. "[N]o promotion of an upcoming [public] offering is possible until 
the registration stat�ment, including the preliminary prospectus, has been filed 
for review with the SEC. As originally conceived, the 'waiting period,'" 
which is the period of time after the registration statement and preliminary 
prospectus have been filed for SEC review, but before the registration 
statement passed SEC review and becomes effective, "was intended to enable 
the agency to preclear the registration statement." Estreicher, supra note 343, 
at 28 1 .  So, during this waiting period, the company that is issuing securities 
. . 
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puffing, was permitted in the period before SEC approval of the 
proposed sale, o1l;t of fear that consumers might be misled concerning 
the true value of the security that would ultimately be issued.346 
After the required registration statement was declared "effective" by 
the SEC, making the securities ripe for sale, the securities could be 
marketed more extensively, though only if preceded or accompanied 
by a prospectus, the form and content of which is prescribed by 
statute. 347 . 
. 
and its financial intermediaries "are prohibited from engaging in direct writing 
campaigns or any media advertising. [The intermediaries] can, however, 
utilize their substantial lists of established customers to advertise orally, 
conditioning the market and attempting to solicit offers to buy through 
personal telephone calls throughout the waiting period." Id. at 280-81 .  
346. See Estreicher, supra note 345, at 281-82. The December 2005 
amendments significantly expand, though still limit, the kind of information 
that can be provided in tombstone advertising. Securities Act of 1933, 17 
C.F.R. § 230. 134 (now permitting, inter alia, statements concerning the nature 
of the firm's business, final maturity and interest rate provisions on fixed 
income securities, descriptions of offering procedures, and expected rating 
agencies). The recent liberalization of Rule 1 34 still describes a highly limited 
advertising regime . (especially as compared to, for example, contemporary 
junk-food advertising), and remains backed by the fundamental concern that 
consumers of securities are vulnerable to overreaching on the part of sellers. 
In the securities context, the tombstone advertising limitation is meant to lead 
potential consumers to inquire further about the security by asking for a copy 
of the highly detailed prospectus that fully describes the offering. See 
Estreicher, supra note 343, at 280. The tombstone blues regime would 
incorporate the same approach, allowing, indeed requiring, junk-food 
promoters to maintain a highly specific and detailed "prospectus" regarding the 
food they sell. Incorporating the "prospectus" into the tombstone blues 
approach provides cover against the Court's instruction that "the States may 
not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading 
information . . .  if the information also may be presented in a way that is not 
deceptive . . . .  " In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191 , 203 (1 982). 
347. EstreiCher, supra note 343, at 282. The December 2005 amendments 
provide greater leeway for firms to "free write," that is, to promote their 
securities without the required accompaniment of a prospectus, as long as the 
prospectus is made available to consumers who may desire to inspect it. 
Securities Act of 1 933, 17  C.F .R. § 230. 1 34 (2005). Free writing is, of course, 
still subject to the strong anti-fraud provisions otherwise embodied in the 
securities laws. See Securities Offering Reform, SEC Release No. 33-8591 
(Dec. 1 , 2005) (adopting release), at 148. Such provisions do not admit of the 
kind of puffery that. is sanctioned in less regulated markets, such as the junk­
food market. As one leading treatise put it, the puffing doctrine in the 
securities regulation context "has all but gone the way of the dodo." 7 LOUIS 
Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3424 (3d. ed. 1991). But 
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, 
This familiar system of regulating the promotion and sale of 
securities provides a very powerful example of extensive 
governmental limitations on advertising which, at least until very 
recently, were widely viewed as entirely appropriate.348 Nothing 
about the reforms implemented by the SEC in 2005 suggests that the 
previous regime ' was .' impermissible; indeed, in promulgating its 
reforms the SEC was responding to perceived efficiency concerns, 
not constitutionat pressures. 349 Justifications traditionally advanced 
for curbing conuhercial speech in the securities area are at least as 
applicable to food advertising to children; most importantly, the 
relative un-sophistication of the consumer vis-a-vis the seller, and the 
vast disparities in their relative access to information.35o It took a 
major social crisis-the Great Depression-before the justifications 
see Jennifer O'Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re­
Emergence of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 
Omo ST. LJ. 1697 ( 1998) (arguing that while the federal securities laws 
clearly indicate a congressional desire to eclipse conventional puffery 
defenses, courts have nevertheless afforded defendants too liberal an 
opportunity to make use of this defense). 
348. See Estreicher, supra note 343. Indeed, the recent liberalizing reforms 
adopted by the SEC were spurred by efficiency concerns, not Constitutional 
pressures. See Securities Offering Reform, SEC Release No. 33-8591 ,  at 297 
(Dec. 1 , 2005); Securities Offering Reform, SEC Release No. 33-8501 (Nov. 3, 
2004) (proposing release). As an aside, consider the relative power of those 
who benefit from extensive government regulation of securities promotion­
relatively affluent members of society who are able to actively trade in the 
securities market-against the relative poverty and powerlessness of those who 
suffer disproportionately the ill effects of what I have argued are misleading, 
yet unregulated, junk-food advertisements. 
349. The SEC's · defense of its reforms makes no mention of First 
Amendment concerns. See, e.g. , Securities Offering Reform, SEC Release No. 
33-8591 .  ' Comments to the SEC on the proposed reforms prior to their 
adoption did not appear to make First Amendment arguments either. See SEC, 
Comments on Proposed Rule: Securities Offering Reform, http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/proposed/s73804.shtml (visited on Dec. 20, 2005) (collecting comments 
to the SEC on its proposed, now adopted, reforms). 
350. See Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: 
Opting Out of Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. 
REv. 5 19, 533-39 (1999) (discussing the history, purpose, and scope of the 
secUrities laws). See generally 2 J. S. ELLENBERGER & ELLEN P. MAHAR, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1 934 (1973) (stating that the general purpose of the 
legislation is to prptect the public and provide the public with complete 
information regarding securities transactions). 
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for pervasive regulation of securities became clear.351  The obesity 
epidemic is this generation's major social crisis that should make the 
justifications for regulating the junk-food market · clear. The 
expansive definition of a "misleading" statement from the securities 
arena can be exploited to develop extensive, but constitutionally 
viable, limitations on fast food advertising.357 
t 
35 1 .  Estreicher, supra note 343, at 291 .  
352. In his analysis of hypothetical tobacco advertising regulatory regimes, 
Professor Redish concludes that a tombstone approach would run afoul of the 
First Amendment. Redish, supra note 1 53, at 638. Redish's argument against 
tombstone advertising is no different than his general argument against 
advertising bans; he uncritically presumes that the prohibited advertising is 
comprised of "persuasive appeals" rather than misleading speech, and then 
concludes that the paternalistic purpose behind prohibiting such appeals cannot 
be countenanced. Id. at 627. Redish stretches his basic idea about speaker 
interests: 
[A] speaker's ability to choose the manner of expression should not be 
viewed as uniquely tied to the speaker's developmental interest, but to 
the listener's free speech rights as well. In the case of tombstone 
limitations, restrictions on the speaker's ability to choose the method 
of expression derive from the same unacceptable paternalistic 
concerns that underlie a total ban: the fear that the public will be 
induced, on the basis of persuasive appeals, to engage in a lawful 
activity because the government does not trust the public's ability to 
make judgments on the basis of those appeals. 
. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
The tombstone blues approach, however, is motivated not by a paternalistic 
purpose, but by a concern that junk-food advertising is powerfully misleading. 
Cf supra text accompanying note 348 (observing that the SEC adopted a 
tombstone approach because securities advertising could mislead consumers 
about the value of the security). Tombstone advertising limits would curtail 
the misleading effects of junk-food advertising while protecting First 
Amendment values. Redish assumes away the possibility that the banned 
advertising is false ·or misleading; thus does not thoroughly address how to 
analyze that question. See id. Redish uses intuition and dispositionism to 
quickly move on: "Bluntly put," he writes, "prohibition of tobacco advertising 
constitutes a governmental exercise in· mind control of its citizens-hardly a 
course . of action consistent with the . . .  First Amendment right of free 
expression." Id. at 639. This is .an easy argument to make and a comfortable 
conclusion to reach when you are content to believe that the only way to 
exercise "mind control" is by restricting speech. But, if "mind control" is on 
the table as a concern, then the power of misleading speech to exercise "mind 
control" should be a dire theoretical and programmatic concern; a concern that 
cannot be solved through "blunt" conclusions about what tobacco advertising 
prohibitions might accomplish. 
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So why stop at a junk-food advertising ban-what is the limiting 
principle in a project such as this? The limitations of the inquiry are 
bound by the requirements of the commercial speech doctrine and 
the First Amendment, the limitations of empirical inquiry, and by 
theoretical imagination. This Article's conclusions have been 
reached through a critical realist exploration of the constitutional 
permissibility of a near-total ban on junk-food advertising to 
children. Critical realism does not promise, and does not provide, 
deductively applicable answers to every legal problem, as some 
approaches purport to do. Nor does critical realism stagnate in 
analytic indeterminacy, as other approaches are sometimes said to 
do. Nothing in the foregoing analysis should be read to suggest that 
the government has, or should have, plenary authority to regulate 
speech, or even commercial speech. 
The human suffering wrought by the obesity epidemic is 
palpable.353 This suffering gives rise to a suspicious inquiry into the 
junk-food marketplace, and junk-food advertising in particular, 
which has led to this Article's conclusions. An analysis of the 
consumer market in blue jeans, or the consumer market in concrete, 
or in mortgages, might reach different conclusions. Blue jeans · 
advertisements, for example, use puffing strategies similar to those 
of junk-food advertisements. Yet the absence of dramatic increases 
in heart disease and kidney failure, diabetes, and premature death 
associated with the over-consumption of blue jeans may suggest that 
its advertising is not misleading in the same way as junk-food 
advertising; i.e. with respect to the health problems associated with 
the consumption. 
I have not argued that puffery is inherently misleading speech, 
even in commercial advertising, nor does my argument inexorably 
lead to such a conclusion. Puffery may enable the exploration and 
expansion of the possibilities of individual or collective identity 
formation through, for example, the consumption of blue jeans 
endowed with a cool expression of human flourishing through 
creative discursive practices in its commercial advertising. 354 The 
353. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64; see also Broken Scales, 
supra note 3, at 1649-52 (describing the health problems and social costs 
associated with overweight and obesity). 
354. See generally PETER N. STEARNS, AMERICAN COOL: CONSTRUCTING A 
TWENTIETH CENTURY EMOTIONAL STYLE (1994) (providing a social history of 
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enormous power of commercial speech to advance such exploration 
is both a reason to grant commercial speech constitutional protection 
and a reason to keep a close eye on its power to mislead consumers. 
My argument has stayed within the Court's commercial speech 
jurisprudence, even as it has attempted to creatively expand it There 
are particular kinds of products and consumer markets that are highly 
susceptible to powerfully manipulative advertising campaigns; the 
junk food for children market is one of them. My analysis honors 
and advances the incrementalism and caution found in the Court's 
First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Still, my suspicious inquiry cannot keep from rousing another 
kind of suspicion protecting First Amendment interests: the concern 
that the arguments advanced here may be applied not just to 
legitimate commercial speech regulation, but also to legitimate the 
regulation of political and social speech in a manner that threatens 
core First Amendment values and perhaps even freedom itself. The 
manipulative power of political speech is, indeed, both evident and 
analytically troubling to the foundations of classical liberalism-it is 
a profound problem that cannot be ignored. While it is beyond the 
I 
scope of this artiCle to fully analyze or respond to that problem, the 
the emergence of "cool" as an innovative emotional style that responded to, 
and advanced, modem alterations in work and social patterns). An important 
body of work in First Amendment scholarship has been dedicated to analyzing 
the centrality and impact of non-informational discursive practices in 
commercial advertising, and the evident disparity between "the eighteenth­
century first amendment, with it's. emphasis on serious public discourse" and 
the "first-amendment triviality" wrought by "the self-indulgent bent of mass 
entertainment culture." Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First 
Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers, 68 TEx. L. REv. 1087, 1 1 1 6  (1 990). 
For an excellent discussion of the First Amendment, see also RONALD K.L. 
COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE (2d ed. 2005). My 
project, while similar in broad orientation to this tradition, also departs from it 
in significant ways. The critical realist approach advances through a 
framework more deeply steeped in social scientific and economic analysis than 
is witnessed in the less formal, autoschediastic "cultural approach" of scholars 
such as Collins and Skover. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Pissing 
in the Snow: A Cultural Approach to the First Amendment, 45 STAN. L. REv. 
783, 785 (1993). As is suggested by my statement in the text provisionally 
distinguishing between concerns presented by junk-food advertising and those 
presented by blue jeans advertising, my approach is also less concerned with 
broad critiques of the "triviality" of modem commercial culture than it is with 
the power of modem advertising to mislead consumers in a manner cognizable 
within the modem commercial speech doctrine. 
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next Part, which is necessary to the advancement of the tombstone 
blues project, begins a critical realist approach to it. 
o 0 
IV. RETHINKING "COMMON SENSE DISTINCTIONS" :  THE PROBLEM OF 
DEEP CAPTURE AND A CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE RESPONSE 
TO IT 
While one m1ay impugn the motive of corporate commentary 
on matters of public concern, it is much harder to morph the 
content of such commentary itself. 355 
-Rodney Smolla 
One of the principle ways that the food industry has attempted to 
avoid responsibility for the harms associated with the obesity crisis is 
by arguing that even if over-consumption of its products causes 
obesity, it is consumers who are responsible for the outcome, since 
the industry is �:>nly responding to, and not inducing, consumer 
demand.356 The food industry promotes this view of consumer 
behavior to courts, government, legal theorists, and to consumers 
themselves. Indeed, much corporate speech is dedicated to the 
promotion of dispositionism, which, it turns out, is an extremely 
effective strategy in the court of public opinion, and in government. 
In my previous work with Hanson, we call this process "deep 
capture."  357 
Certainly dispositionism is promoted through conventional 
product advertising.358 But "deep capture" is pursued in many other 
ways as well. A full elaboration of such methods is beyond the 
scope of this ArtiCle, but one illustrative example that my co-authors 
and I featured in Broken Scales was the food industry's financing of 
"issue advocacy" groups that do not shill corporate products directly, 
but instead actively promote-to consumers and regulators-the 
dispositionist conception of human agency on which maximal profit 
355.  Smolla, supra note 124, at 1287. 
356. See Broken Scales, supra note 3, at 1797-98 (exploring this argument 
in the context of tJ:te obesity epidemic); Hanson & Y osifon, The Situation, 
supra note 2 1 ,  at 249-50 (explaining the basic form of this argument). 
357. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 2 1 ,  at 202-20 
(describing the deep capture hypothesis); see also supra text accompanying 
note 58 (describing deep capture). 
358. See Broken Scales, supra note 3, at 1709-1 1 (describing the promotion 
of dispositionism in conventional advertising; e.g., "You asked for, you got it !" 
(Toyota), "Have it your way!"  (Burger King), etc.). 
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thrives.359
· 
Consider, for example, an outfit known as The Center for 
Consumer Freedom, a corporate-funded organization dedicated to 
"pr�motin� personal �esponsi?ili� and protecting . consumer chOIces. ,,3 0 One way this orgamzatIon seeks to advance Its purpose 
is through print and broadcast advertising.36 I For example, a print 
advertising campaign promulgated by the group presents a picture of 
a dangling belt; the caption above the belt reads in large letters : 
"Common Sense Obesity Warning. ,,362 Below the belt (so to speak), 
the ad reads: "At the Center for Consumer Freedom, we think adults 
are smart enough to choose what to eat and when to move. The only 
warnings you really need are about food cops, bureaucrats, and trial 
lawyers. ,,363 This organization also produces radio, television and 
Internet advertising campaigns with similar themes.364 
For corporations to be funding this kind of advertisin�, it must 
be important to their bottom line, and it must be working. 65 Thus, 
359. See id. at 1747-48. 
360. The Center for Consumer Freedom, About Us http://www. 
consumerfreedom.comlabout.cfm (last visited Jan. 3 1 ,  2006); see also Broken 
Scales, supra note 3, at 1742-43 (elaborating on this organization's role in 
combating junk food regulation); Hanson & Y osifon, The Situation, supra note 
2 1 ,  at 249-50 (discussing this organization); . 
36 1 .  See The Center for Consumer Freedom, http://www.consumerfreedom. 
com (last visited Aug. 1 8, 2005). 
362. Id. (follow "Ad Canipaigns" hyperlink; then follow "Print Ads" 
hyperlink; then select advertisement number 14). lri the smaller print of the 
advertisement, the notches of the belt are labeled as if to indicate the occasion 
on which the belt was expanded; they read, serially: "The Sopranos, Season 
Three," "Wife's Lasagna," "Bought Sony PlayStation," and "Hired Lawn 
Service." The Center for Consumer Freedom, Common Sense, Obesity 
Warning, http://www.consumerfreedom.comlimages/ads/fullsize/print_ 
obesity_belt.jpg (last visited Jan. 3 1 ,  2006). The humor is part of how the 
advertisement works. But notice the complete absence of any mention of junk 
food, let alone junk-food advertising. Id. lriterestingly, the advertisement is 
sponsored by the food and restaurant industry and yet there is no mention of 
their food in this advertisement's discourse on the causes of obesity. 
363. Center for Consumer Freedom, Print Ads, http://www. 
consumerfreedom.comladvertisements_detail.cfmladl22 (last visited Jan. 3 1 ,  
2006). 
364. See The Center . for Consumer Freedom, Home, http://www. consumerfreedom.com (last visited Aug. 1 8, 2005) (describing these 
campaigns). I 
365. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 2 1 ,  at 277 n.523 
(analyzing the importance of staged financing in ensuring that institutions 
supported by corporate money indeed serve the corporate purpose). 
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i 
such deep capture efforts pique the analytic impulse at work in the 
previous sections, which were concerned with the misleading power 
of conventional product advertising. However, this kind of speech, 
which is social and political in nature, may lay claim to greater First 
Amendment protection than that afforded the · conventional 
commercial speech analyzed above. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Product Corp. , 366 the Court held that pamphlets circulated through 
the mail by a manufacturer of contraceptives constituted commercial 
speech, and thus iwould be analyzed under the intermediate scrutiny 
standard of Central Hudson.367 That the pamphlets, in addition to 
promoting the name of the company's product, provided important 
non-commercial information regarding sexually transmitted diseases, 
did not compel a stricter standard: "A company has the full panoply 
of protections available to its direct comments on public issues, so 
there is no reason for providing similar constitutional protection 
when such statements are made in the context of commercial 
transactions. ,,368 There are two challenging principles in this 
holding. The first is that companies enjoy full First Amendment 
protection when speaking on social or political issues.369 The second 
is that the Court seems to be saying that one of the reasons that it 
allows the government greater latitude when it comes to regulating 
purely commercial speech is because social and political speech by 
the same commercial speakers would be entitled to the "full panoply" 
of First Amendment protections, so there is no threat to such 
speech.37o 
. These conclusions, however, are only the point of departure for 
inquiring into the permissibility of regulating deep capture 
advertising; it is not the end of the inquiry. The Court's oft-repeated 
claim, cited from Bolger, that companies are entitled to the "full 
panoply" of First Amendment protections when speaking on political 
and social issues,371 at least as applied to corporate speech, is an 
exaggeration of its own jurisprudence on the issue. In my view, the 
366. 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
367. See id. at 68 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo 
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980)). 
. 
368. Id . 
. 369. Id. at 69. 
370. Id. at 68. 
371 .  See id. 
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Court's actual jurisprudence in this area is sufficient, analytically and 
normatively, to sustain the regulation of corporate deep capture 
advertising. 
In a formative case in 1978, First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti,372 the Court reviewed a Massachusetts statute that forbade 
corporations from expending corporate funds to influence an� public 
referenda that did not bear materially on its business.3 3 The 
Massachusetts legislature . passed the statute after corporate funds had 
been spent fighting several successive failed public referenda seeking 
to amend the state Constitution to allow for graduated personal 
income taxes.374 The statutory prohibition included a provision 
specifying that any referenda on personal income taxes was to be 
considered immaterial to the business of any bank or business 
corporation.375 Prior to Bellotti, the Court had already held that it 
was within the government's power to limit co�orate campaign 
donations to particular candidates for public office. 76 Insulating the 
political system from the intimation of corruption that accompanies 
such financing was viewed as sufficient justification for the 
limitation on political contributions, even under a strict scrutiny 
standard.377 But in Bellotti, the Court declined to extend that 
reasoning . to allow the government to forestall campaign financing 
by corporations in public referenda.378 The Court simply found that 
the corporate funding of referendum campaigns does not emit as 
coarse a stench of political corruption as does corporate financing of 
individual campaigns.379 
As in the conventional commercial speech cases, the Court does 
not approach its analysis from the perspective . of the corporate 
speaker, but rather, from the perspective of listener interests: "The 
372. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
373. Id. Bellotti was decided as the Court forged the modem commercial 
speech doctrine in cases like Virginia Pharmacy and Bates. Bellotti itself is 
thus a crucial pillar in modem commercial speech jurisprudence, broadly 
construed. 
374. Id. at 769. 
375. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp, 1977). 
· 376. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786-87 n.24 (citing, inter alia, Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1 (1976» . 
377. See id. at 788-89 . .  
378. Id. at 787-88 n.26 . .  
379. Id. 
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proper question, . . .  is not whether corporations 'have' First 
Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with 
those of natural persons. . . . [I]nstead, the question must be whether 
[the statute] abridges expression that the First Amendment was 
meant to protect. ,,380 From this perspective, the Court saw corporate 
speech on the referenda at issue in Bellotti to be precisely the kind of 
expression the First Amendment was meant to protect: "The inherent 
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public 
does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, 
association, union, or individual. ,,381 Since the identity of the 
speaker is irrelev,ant to the value of the speech, social and political 
speech is important enough to merit full First Amendment protection 
even where the speakers are corporate entities. Thus, Bellotti is often 
cited as a case that gave full First Amendment protection to 
corporate social and political speech.382 
From this Article's perspective, however, Bellotti is better read 
for its promise that corporate social and political speech could be 
regulated where the unregulated power of such speech perverted, 
rather than served, First Amendment values. Though it found that 
Massachusetts's statute failed strict scrutiny, the Court issued a 
provocative reservation: 
Appellee [Massachusetts] advances a number of arguments 
in support of [its] view that [First Amendment] interests are 
endangered by corporate participation in discussion of a 
referendum issue. They hinge upon the assumption that 
such participation would exert an undue influence on the 
outcome of a referendum vote, and-in the end-destroy 
380. Id. at 776. 
381 .  Id. at 777. , 
382. See, e.g. , Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good 
For General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 
QEO. WASH. 1. REv.' 235 ( 1998). Not everyone saw it as a positive 
development. See id. at 257 n. 162 ("[Bellottll paid only lip service to the 
rights of listeners" and served the interests of "the privileged few who can 
spend unlimited amounts of money to purchase political effectiveness." 
(quoting J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First 
Amendment an Ob�tac/e to Political Equality, 82 COLUM. 1. REv. 609, 641 
(1982))); see also Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate 
Political Expenditures and Redish 's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. 
REv. 646, 662 (1981-1982) (providing a penetrating critique of Bellotti and 
Professor Redish's views about corporate social and political speech). 
HeinOnline -- 39 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 596 2006
596 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:507 
the confidence of the people in the democratic process and 
the integrity of government. According to appellee, 
corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may 
drown out other points of view. If appellee's arguments 
were supported by record or legislative findings that 
corporate advocacy threatened imminently to 
. 
undermine 
democratic ,processes, thereby denigrating rather than 
serving Firsf Amendment interests, these arguments would 
merit our consideration. But there has been no showing that 
the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or . 
even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts, 
or that there has been any threat to the confidence of the 
citizenry in government.383 
The analysis provides a germ of a justification for regulating 
corporate social and political speech. Indeed, it reveals, once again, 
a latent sensitivity to the reality of the situational character in the 
Court's First Amendment analysis. As my exegesis of the situational 
character emphasized above, we have limited perceptive and 
cognitive capacity. We are at least potentially vulnerable to being 
"overwhelm[ed] " by some stimuli to the exclusion of being able to 
reckon with others. That is all the Court recognized in Bellotti-but 
it is a decisive commitment to reality.384 
383. ' Bellotti, ' 435 U.S. at 789-90 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Justice White dissented, criticizing the majority for not accepting evidence 
before the Court that, prior to the enactment of the ban under review, corporate 
expenditures on referendums had far outpaced that of other participants in such 
referendums. See id. at 809-1 1 .  (White, J., dissenting). The majority rebutted 
White, claiming that the Court had before it only incomplete information on 
corporate and other expenditures on referendums, and that in any event it was 
clear that corporate money was not such an influential voice in the referendum 
after all, because the income tax referendum failed again in Massachusetts 
while the case was pending, even though corporate money was not spent in the 
referendum. Id. at 790 n.28. The Court apparently did not appreciate that 
corporate expenditure in previous versions of the referendum, which also had 
failed, may have had lasting effect on public opinion in subsequent 
referendums. 
384. Id. at 789-90: It is important to note that where the Court addresses 
regulation of conventional commercial speech it looks at the falsity or 
misleading nature of the speech, or the success of the regulation in advancing a 
substantial goverrurient interest in a tailored fashion. See, e.g. , Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Prods, Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68-72 (1983). Where the Court 
addresses corporate political speech, however, these questions drop out of the 
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This conception has not yet fully matured in First Amendment 
theory, but it is buddin�. For example, in Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, 85 the Court upheld a Michigan law 
prohibiting corporations from using funds from the corporate 
treasury to support or oppose candidates for state offices.386 The law 
did permit expenditures from segregated corporate funds used solely 
for political purposes.387 Justice Thurgood Marshall's opinion for the 
Court in Austin relied first on the disproportionate power that 
corporations have as a result of state conferred advantages provided 
by the corporate form, and second on the reality of human limitations 
respecting information processing.388 The Court found that the 
state's limitation on corporate political speech permissibly aimed to 
remedy "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the 
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's 
support for the corporation's political ideas. ,,389 
picture and the Court focuses on the volume of such speech and its power to 
potentially overwhelm or exclude other speech. See, e.g. , Bel/otti, 435 U.S. at 
789-90. So in the political speech context there is once again recognition of 
the situational character, but it is a different aspect of the situational character, 
one which does not require any argument about situational influence being 
false or misleading? but rather simply that such influence is overwhelming, 
therefore harming nither than serving First Amendment interests. 
385.  494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
386. Id. at 706. 
387. Id. 
388. Id. It might be thought that the "state conferred benefit" approach to 
justifying the regulation of corporate political speech raises the "greater power 
contains the lesser'� analytic fallacy, but it does not. Government does not 
have a right to regulate corporate speech simply because government could 
crush corporations altogether. Rather, the Court accepts government's claim 
that the very creation of corporate organizational forms without concomitant 
speech regulation would powerfully distort important First Amendment values. 
Id. at 659�0. Government is simply trying to create efficient business forms 
that do not become Frankenstein monsters as far as First Amendment values 
are concerned. 
389. Id. at 660. The Court took pains to emphasize that the latitude it allows 
for the regulation of political speech by profit-oriented business corporations 
does not apply to the political speech of social and political organizations. See 
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1 986) 
(holding limitations on political . speech by non-profit social and political 
organizations to be unconstitutional). 
. 
. . 
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Professor Redish, disapproving of Austin, argues that in it "the 
Court appears to have either ignored or at least partially abandoned 
the principles it had wisely recognized in Bellotti. ,,39o I think that it 
is better to say that the Court in Austin made good on the promise of 
regUlatory latitude that it very clearly made in Bellotti. Austin 
suggests that the "overwhelm[ance]" idea from Bellotti survives to 
provide a jurisprudential basis for the regulation of deep capture 
advertising.391 Today, there is substantial evidence that corporate 
spending has come to dominate social and political debate in this 
country to such an extent that it threatens to overwhelm other 
voices.392 Corporate deep capture campaigns, replete with astro-turf 
organizing, the maintenance of front groups, and the sponsorship of 
knowledge production at both think tanks and elite universities, 
suggests that corporate advocacy of social and political interests is 
far more pervasive and sophisticated than it was in 1 978, when 
Bellotti was decided.393 Whether the present Court would be willing 
to make good on its reservation with respect to "overwhelming" 
speech in Bellotti and Austin is questionable, but the theory 
supporting it is sensible, and the evidence to invoke it is available.394 
390. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 382, at 236. 
391 .  Austin, 494 U.S. 659-60. In Bellotti, the Court also stated that a 
corporation could be required to explicitly claim responsibility for the political 
speech that it funded. 435 U.S. at 809. Such a requirement would serve the 
information proliferating purpose of corporate political speech, but would not 
be permitted with respect to speech by natural persons. Requiring the 
prominent identification of corporate sponsorship in the deep capture 
advertising such funding produces would go a significant way toward 
combating the misleading nature of such advertising. 
392 . . To further develop the "overwhelming" angle suggested by the Court in 
Bellotti and· employed in Austin, a satisfying inquiry must be guided by 
contemporary teachings of social science. · A simple tally of voices or an 
accounting of money spent will not suffice. Rather, it must be recognized, for 
reasons explained above, that the sophistication with which a corporate giant 
develops and conveys "political speech" may be substantially greater than that 
which a public interest group or politically motivated individuals can bring to 
it. 
393. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 21 ,  at 21 3-33 
(discussing the breadth of contemporary deep capture efforts). 
394. Bellotti pertained to corporate financing of public referendum 
campaigns. 435 U.S. 765 The kind of deep capture advertising that I have 
highlighted in this section is generally not directed, at least explicitly, at the 
advocacy of a particular referendum issue, or even a particular piece of 
legislation. Rather, these advertisements, like those by the Center for 
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In any event, I find cause for hope in Redish's lament that "although 
the doctrinal messages sent by the Court undoubtedly have been 
mixed, the modem trend appears unmistakably away from extending 
full-fledged constitutional protection to corporate speech. ,,395 
Redish takes issue with the "overwhelmance" approach in a 
manner that might serve as a general rebuttal to the entire analytic 
project advanced in this Article. Redish appreciates the logical 
cogency of the "overwhelmance" approach to commercial speech 
regulation, but insists that the evidence is indeterminate as to 
whether such conditions obtain in contemporary society, with respect 
to corporate speech; in the face of such ambiguity, we must err in 
favor of allowing unfettered speech.396 For Redish, however, the 
indeterminacy that he finds regarding the question of speech 
"overwhelmance" is, in the end, a necessary conclusion. Indeed, he 
concludes that critically driven inquiry of human perception and 
Consumer Freedom, are directed at the development of public opinion in 
furtherance of the corporate enterprise generally, whether it is in forestalling 
regulation, legislation or referenda, or even more generally to perpetuate a 
social atmosphere conducive to the consumption of corporate products. See 
supra text accompanying notes 358-365. There is nothing in Bellotti 's 
principle that would, if the case were made, forestall its application to the kind 
of deep capture advertising I am treating here. Fighting its way through 
thickets of speech and association issues, the Court has allowed limitations on 
some kinds of corporate political spending for good reason; once the problem 
of deep capture is appreciated, these limitations can be extended to social issue 
advertising as well. 
395. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 382, at 238. Following Professor 
Redish's example of restraint in his seminal commercial speech article, I will 
stop short of claiming that political and social speech by corporations should 
be subject to the exact same level of scrutiny as "common sense" commercial 
speech, like product advertising. Determining the precise level of scrutiny 
must be the subject of further theoretical elaboration, as would the design of a 
programmatic regulatory approach to deep capture advertising, which may or 
may not resemble the tombstone blues ban of junk-food advertising suggested 
in this Article. See supra Part III.B.3.  
396. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 382, at 289 (citations omitted) ("To 
the extent that guaranteeing economically powerful corporations' First 
Amendment rights would displace expression of others, the constitutional 
analysis this Article adopts in the prior section might require revision. No one, 
however, has made a persuasive argument-on either intuitive or empirical 
grounds-that sucIi. is actually the case.") (citations omitted). This is 
reminiscent of Professor Redish's claim that the evidence is ambiguous as to 
whether consumers are misled by tobacco advertising. See supra text 
accompanying notes 199�200. 
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information processing is impossible if the First Amendment is to be 
preserved. We are bound, he insists, to our intuitive experience of 
ourselves.397 "In short," Redish writes: 
. 
one cannot construe the First Amendment to allow the 
government :conclusively to determine either how citizens 
process information or when the fear of an information 
overload dictates a need for governmental intervention. 
Society can never be sure that such a point ever exists, 
much less that citizens have, in fact, reached it. 398 . 
But what kind of conception of human agency would one have 
to embrace to believe that we cannot be sure that "such a point ever 
exists" at which human beings are beset with "information 
overload?" Are 'we not finite beings-are our minds not limited? 
Contrary to Redish's doubts, we can be certain that such a point 
exists. Indeed, we must know that all of our thinking about the 
world is shaped by our limited capacity to perceive and grapple with 
all that is happening in it. Commercial speech analysis should begin 
at precisely the place that Redish claims is off-limits to inquiry. 
Redish argues: 
[n]o matter how often or loudly one disseminates 
expression . . .  '[i]f democracy is to have meaning, we must 
generally assume that speech affects voting behavior only 
when it pers,uades.' Indeed, neither the First Amendment 
nor the democratic system of which it is a part could 
function Under any other premise.399 
This is a debilitating presumption, an anti-liberal one in that it 
insists on faith and the blind restraint of critical inquiry. In his 
commercial speech analysis Redish is obsessed with consistency, but 
it is hardly ·consistent with the principles behind the First 
Amendment and the democratic system to accept ignorance due to 
fear of the implications of examination. Indeed, Redish and other 
commentators insist that a paternalistic purpose of maintaining 
human ignorance for people's own good can never be countenanced 
by the First Amendment-surely, then, such a purpose should not be 
397. Redish & Wassennan, supra note 382, at 294-97. 
398 . . Id. at 290 (quoting David Shelledy, Autonomy. Debate. and Corporate 
Speech, 1 8  HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541,  574 (1991)). 
399. Id. at 268. . 
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countenanced at the core of First Amendment theory. 
V. CONCLUSION: RESISTING DEEP CAPTURE 
I have endeavored to elucidate a fresh understanding of the 
commercial speech doctrine, one that abandons dispositionist 
presumptions within the doctrine and accommodates the reality of 
the situational character by developing situational sensitivity that is 
already latent in the commercial speech doctrine. The tombstone 
blues junk-food advertising ban provides an outline for a critical 
realist approach to commercial speech regulation that could 
effectively respond to the childhood obesity epidemic without 
violating constitutional interests. The examination of deep capture 
advertising provides a basis for understanding commercial speech 
that goes beyond "common sense distinctions," and provides a more 
critical approach to corporate social and political speech. 
These arguments are made in a political climate that may ' have 
little enthusiasm for their conclusions. Senator Harkin's proposal to 
extend the FTC's regulatory authority over advertising directed at 
children400 may come to pass, but nothing like a tombstone blues 
junk-food advertising ban appears on the horizon. Yet, I hope that 
the analysis of the commercial speech doctrine advanced by this 
article may have a progressive political effect, in that it may show 
the possibility of a potent approach to regulating commercial speech 
that will not offend constitutional values. 
400. See supra note 160 (describing Harkin's proposal). 
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